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ABSTRACT
Using data on approximately 2,500 environmental and social shareholder proposals, we show that
institutional investors from civil law countries use their voting power to positively influence the CSR
of common law firms. A one percentage point increase in civil law institutional ownership increases
the percentage of votes in favor of US environmental and social proposals by 0.66 percentage points.
Exploring their motive for doing so, we provide evidence that institutional investors from civil law
countries are more likely to support CSR for financial rather than social reasons. In comparison to
institutional investors from common law countries, we argue that institutional investors from civil
law countries have a more enlightened view of value maximization: they believe that the creation
of stakeholder value ultimately benefits shareholder value.
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I. Introduction
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is of increasing importance to institutional investors. In
2018, more than 70% of large U.S. institutional funds claimed to incorporate environmental, social,
and governance (ESG) factors into their financial decision making, while this was just 35% in 2015
(Callan Institute, 2018). Additionally, institutional investors positively drive the environmental
and social (E&S) performance of the firms in which they invest (Dyck, Lins, Roth, & Wagner,
2018). Potential mechanisms for doing so are to engage with firm management privately or to file a
shareholder proposal publicly. Since the E&S conduct of a firm can have a substantial impact on its
performance, it is essential to understand which characteristics determine whether an institutional
investor aims to drive CSR. By understanding the preferences of their investors, firms can anticipate
and adapt to future engagements.
Institutional investors’ support for CSR is dependent on several country characteristics. Dyck et
al. (2018) find that the effect of institutional ownership on CSR is entirely driven by foreign investors
from countries with high social norms. It follows that investors transplant their local social norms
and as a result, influence the CSR adoption of foreign firms. However, instead of social norms, a
stronger predictor of CSR adoption is a country’s legal origin. Liang and Renneboog (2017) show
that firms in civil law countries have higher CSR compared to firms in common law countries. This
conclusion holds after controlling for political institutions, regulations, social preferences, a firm’s
financial and operating performance, and a broad set of country- and firm-level control variables.
In this paper, we consolidate the findings of Dyck et al. (2018) and Liang and Renneboog
(2017). First, we examine whether civil law institutional investors use their voting power on public
E&S shareholder proposals to drive the CSR of US (common law) firms. Second, we test whether
institutional investors’ support for CSR is motivated by social norms or financial value. Following
Liang and Renneboog (2017), we make a distinction between civil law and common law institutional
investors and test whether the motive for supporting E&S issues depends on the legal origin of an
investor.
On the one hand, an institutional investor can be value-seeking; the support for responsible
business behavior is a result of the investor’s belief that investments in CSR create financial value.
The value-seeking, or value-enhancing, investor believes that meeting the demands of stakeholders
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is an integral part of a firm’s long-term market value maximization (Jensen, 2002). This investor
does not consider CSR as a cost imposed on shareholders, but as an opportunity for firms to invest
in its relationship with stakeholders (Martin, Petty, & Wallace, 2009). On the other hand, an
institutional investor can be values-driven; the support for responsible business behavior is a result
of the investor’s social norms. The values-driven investor is willing to take on some costs in order
to create or prevent the destruction of social value (Derwall, Koedijk, & Ter Horst, 2011).
Whether an investor is value-seeking or values-driven possibly depends on the investor’s legal
origin. Common law countries have a shareholder-oriented view; the corporation is a private entity,
and its primary purpose is to maximize shareholder wealth. Practicing CSR in these countries is
an explicit, deliberate, and often strategic decision (Matten & Moon, 2008). In contrast, civil law
countries have a stakeholder-oriented view; the corporation has both public and private roles, and
its primary purpose is to serve the interests of a broader range of stakeholders (Harper Ho, 2009).
CSR in civil law countries is a more implicit reaction to a corporation’s institutional environment
(Matten & Moon, 2008).1
Based on the distinction between explicit and implicit CSR, one might argue that CSR in
common law countries is more closely tied to financial value. However, we hypothesize that the
implicit CSR system in Europe (civil law) provides managers with a better understanding of the
strategic benefits of CSR by forcing them to closely collaborate with stakeholders. For example,
the system of co-determination, popular in northern Europe, allows employees and trade-unions
to participate in firm decision-making (Jurgens, Berthon, Papania, & Shabbir, 2010), granting the
firm valuable information on stakeholder interests.
According to the enlightened value maximization theory of Jensen (2002), taking stakeholder
interests into account in firm decision-making is ultimately beneficial for shareholder value. By
creating and maintaining good relations with important stakeholders, the total long-term firm
market value is maximized. In line with this enlightened value maximization approach, anecdotal
evidence suggests that firms and investors in Europe believe that investing in CSR is financially
material for firm performance.
CEO’s of large European companies have stated that sustainability is an integral part of their
1Matten and Moon (2008) base their paper on a comparison of CSR between Europe and the US. However, their
argument is based on the stakeholder and shareholder models, which result from a country’s legal origin. Moreover,
European and US ownership is by far the largest in our dataset.
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business operations. For example, Alan Jope, CEO of Unilever, says that his company’s commit-
ment to responsible business “is not about putting purpose ahead of profits, it is purpose that drives
profits.” Moreover, European institutional investors are more likely to believe that ESG is financially
material for investment performance compared to US investors (Amel-Zadeh & Serafeim, 2017; van
Duuren, Plantinga, & Scholtens, 2016; CFA Institute, 2017). For instance, in a global sample of
126 fund managers, 67% of European managers believe that socially responsible investing has a
positive impact on financial performance, compared to only 17% of US managers (van Duuren et
al., 2016).
These observations lead to two hypotheses. First, we hypothesize that vote support for E&S
shareholder proposals targeting US firms is higher when a larger share of institutional investors
owns the firm. Additionally, when we distinguish by legal origin, we expect that the positive
effect of civil law institutional ownership on vote support is higher compared to the positive effect
of common law institutional ownership. Second, we hypothesize that, compared to common law
institutional investors, civil law institutional investors are more likely to be driven by financial,
rather than social motives.
We obtain data on approximately 2,500 shareholder proposals that target S&P1500 firms be-
tween 2000 and 2013 from Institutional Shareholder Services. Using a fractional logit model, we find
that the percentage of votes in favor of a proposal increases by 0.66 (0.06) percentage points when
ownership from civil law (common law) institutional investors increases by one percentage point.
This indicates that civil law institutional use their voting power to improve the CSR performance
of US firms.
To test whether value-seeking or values-driven behavior motivates the support for E&S propos-
als, we interact civil and common law institutional ownership with the target firm’s ESG score. The
value-seeking approach implies that there is a level of CSR investment at which its contribution
to long-term firm value is optimal: a firm that underinvests in CSR does not reap the full benefits
that CSR can provide, while a firm that overinvests in CSR destroys firm value since the marginal
financial benefits do not outweigh the marginal costs. Hence, the implied relation between CSR
investments and long-term firm value is positive and concave. Based on this relation, we assume
that the expected financial value of a CSR proposal is higher when the ex-ante CSR score of the
target firm is lower. Empirical evidence from Flammer (2011), Krüger (2015) and Harjoto, Jo, and
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Kim (2017) supports this assumption.
To calculate a firm’s ESG score, we use the MSCI KLD database. This data includes binary in-
dicators for a multitude of ESG strengths and concerns and is often used in academic work (David,
Bloom, & Hillman, 2007; Grewal, Serafeim, & Yoon, 2016; Hillman & Keim, 2001; Statman &
Glushkov, 2009). Following the conclusion of Mattingly and Berman (2006) that positive and neg-
ative social action are distinct constructs that should not be combined, we include KLD strengths
and concerns separately in our analyses.
After controlling for several firm and proposal-specific control variables, we find a negative
interaction effect between civil law institutional ownership (Civil) and the KLD strengths score.
Plotting the marginal effect of Civil on vote support at different levels of KLD strengths shows
that the effect is significantly positive at low levels of strengths and becomes significantly negative
at high levels of strengths. These results hold when examining the total KLD score (strengths
minus concerns). In contrast, there is no significant interaction effect between Common and KLD
strengths, concerns, or the total score.
We examine the robustness of our results by taking into account two additional considerations:
the materiality of the proposal topics, and the influence of proxy advisors. We base the expected
financial value of a proposal on the ex-ante ESG score of the target firm; an alternative way to
determine the financial relevance of a proposal is to determine its financial materiality. Following
Grewal et al. (2016) and Schopohl (2017), we use the SASB Materiality Map, to classify each
proposal as material or immaterial based on its topic description. We find that material proposals do
not receive higher vote support compared to immaterial proposals. Moreover, there is no significant
interaction effect between civil law institutional ownership and the materiality indicator.
Two complications explain the lack of a significant finding. Even though a proposal topic is
material, the proposal content might be immaterial. Detailed textual analyses of proxy statements
to more closely examine the proposal content go beyond the scope of this paper. Moreover, our
results depend on the beliefs of shareholders concerning the materiality of each topic, and these
might not be consistent with SASB’s beliefs.
The second robustness test accounts for proxy recommendations. Institutional investors hold
a large number of securities, and because it is costly to be informed on each proposal, they often
rely on proxy advisors. These proxy advisors perform independent research and provide their
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clients with a vote recommendation. Previous research indicates that these recommendations can
substantially steer voting outcomes (Aggarwal, Erel, & Starks, 2014; Ertimur, Ferri, & Oesch,
2013). We obtain data from ProxyInsight on the vote recommendations of ISS and Glass Lewis
for a small subset of our sample and find that our findings remain robust to the inclusion of vote
recommendations.
Our paper makes several contributions. We contribute to the literature on CSR and shareholder
activism by obtaining new insights regarding the influence of institutional investors on E&S pro-
posals. Gillan and Starks (2000) examine the support for corporate governance proposals and find
a significantly positive effect of institutional ownership. We are the first to show that this result
holds for E&S proposals; previous studies did not find any significant relation between institutional
ownership and support (Schopohl, 2017; Thomas & Cotter, 2007).2 Furthermore, we add to the
literature by showing that civil law institutional investors have an economically meaningful positive
impact on the success of public shareholder engagements.
We also add to the literature on investors’ motives to invest socially responsible. Riedl and
Smeets (2017) show that social preferences and social signaling explain the socially responsible
investment decision of individual investors. Norm-constrained institutions, such as pension plans,
also base their investment decision on social preferences (Hong & Kacperczyk, 2009). Furthermore,
Dyck et al. (2018) find that social norms play a significant role in the decision of institutional
investors to drive CSR. In contrast, we show that financial motives better explain the support
of institutional investors from civil law countries for CSR. The importance of financial motives is
consistent with the belief of European investors that ESG information is financially material for
investment performance (Amel-Zadeh & Serafeim, 2017; van Duuren et al., 2016; CFA Institute,
2017).
Lastly, we contribute to the literature on corporate ownership and CSR. Barnea and Rubin
(2010) show that insider ownership is negatively related to the social rating of US firms. They do
not find a correlation between institutional ownership and social ratings. In an international study,
Dyck et al. (2018) provide evidence of a positive association between institutional ownership and
a firm’s E&S performance. This result also holds for US firms, but it is mostly foreign ownership
2Thomas and Cotter (2007) only use data on 403 E&S proposals, while Schopohl (2017) loses part of her observations
because not all proposals can be linked to the SASB Materiality Map that she uses.
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from countries with high social norms that drives this result. We show that civil law institutional
investors aim to improve the CSR performance of US firms by using their voting power to support
E&S shareholder proposals. Hence, there is a potential positive relationship between civil law
ownership of US firms and their CSR performance.
We continue our paper as follows. In section II, we discuss which institutional investors support
CSR. Moreover, we examine why and how they do this. In section III, we introduce our data and
explain our methodology. In section IV, we provide an overview of E&S proposals and present
our main results. In section V, we discuss two additional considerations: financial materiality and
proxy advisors. In section VI, we summarize our findings.
II. The Support for CSR
Dyck et al. (2018) demonstrate that institutional investors improve the E&S performance of
firms worldwide. On the one hand, they find that financial reasons motivate this; the effect of
institutional ownership on E&S performance increased after the financial crisis. On the other
hand, they find that social reasons motivate this; cross-sectional evidence of investors indicates
that the positive effect of institutional ownership on E&S performance is driven by institutional
investors domiciled in countries with strong social norms. In contrast to social norms, Liang and
Renneboog (2017) find that legal origin is the most essential driver of CSR. Their cross-sectional
evidence of firms, rather than investors, shows that firms in civil law countries have higher CSR
than firms in common law countries. The authors controlled for multiple factors that potentially
influence CSR performance (political institutions, regulations, social preferences, a firm’s financial
and operating performance, and a broad set of country- and firm-level control variables) but legal
origin appears to be the strongest predictor.
Accordingly, this paper focuses on the legal origin of institutional investors and aims to con-
solidate the findings of Dyck et al. (2018) and Liang and Renneboog (2017) by answering three
questions. First, who drives CSR? More specifically, do institutional investors from civil law coun-
tries transplant their view on CSR by driving the E&S performance of common law firms? Second,
why do institutional investors drive CSR? Dyck et al. (2018) found evidence for both financial
and social reasons but did not examine whether the motive is dependent on the legal origin of an
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investor. Lastly, how do institutional investors drive CSR? To answer this question, we empirically
examine vote support for E&S shareholder proposals.
A. Who?
There are two main legal traditions: common law and civil law. Traditionally, corporate law
in common law countries is shareholder oriented (La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny,
1998). Private market outcomes are preferred and there is limited interference by the government.
Because of the shareholder orientation, small shareholders are well-protected, and this results in
dispersed ownership and more transaction-driven behavior. Ultimately, this can lead to a focus on
short-term profit maximization (La Porta & Lopez-de silanes, 1999; Jacoby, 2001; Kim, Park, &
Ryu, 2017).
In contrast, civil law countries are stakeholder oriented. Firms in these countries typically have
concentrated ownership structures (La Porta et al., 1998), with a high level of ownership by man-
agers (Kim et al., 2017). Moreover, Liang and Renneboog (2017) show that the stricter regulatory
protection of stakeholders reflects stronger social preferences for good corporate behavior and a
stakeholder orientation. Both the ownership structure and the social preferences of investors in-
crease incentives for firms in civil law countries to focus on long-term value maximization. Empirical
evidence shows that institutional investors transplant norms, resulting from their regulatory envi-
ronment, to foreign firms. Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira, and Matos (2011) find that foreign institutions
from countries with strong shareholder protection (common law countries) improve the corporate
governance of firms in countries with weak shareholder protection (civil law countries). Following
the finding of Liang and Renneboog (2017) that CSR is higher in civil law countries compared
to common law countries, we expect that foreign institutions from civil law countries improve the
E&S performance of firms in common law countries.
We are not arguing that institutional investors from common law countries do not perceive CSR
as important. We must distinguish between two different effects: the effect of being an institutional
investor and the effect of the investor’s legal origin on the perception of CSR. Hence, depending
on their legal origin, institutional investors have different motives for promoting CSR, and this
ultimately impacts the amount of CSR in their respective countries. The following section first
discusses the reasons why institutional investors drive CSR, and subsequently considers differences
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based on the legal origin of these investors.
B. Why?
Kinder (2005) argues that socially responsible investing can be values-based, value-seeking, or
value-enhancing. Values-based investors adjust their portfolio based on religious or ethical beliefs.
They are willing to incur financial costs in exchange for an increase in non-financial personal
utility. In contrast, value-seeking investors believe that investing socially responsible can lead to
improved financial returns while value-enhancing investors actively seek value by using shareholder
engagement to influence firm behavior. Hence, the primary motive for investing socially responsible
is either social or financial.
While Riedl and Smeets (2017) find that individual investors primarily hold socially respon-
sible mutual funds because of social preferences and social signaling, institutional investors have
conceivably less room to consider these preferences in their investment behavior. Fiduciary duty
dictates that institutional investors act in the best interest of their beneficiaries and some investors
argue that this fiduciary duty and the need to deliver financial returns restricts them from invest-
ing socially responsible (CFA Institute, 2017). However, Sullivan, Martindale, Feller, and Bordon
(2016) argue that the consideration of ESG information by institutional investors is entirely in line
with their fiduciary duty because ESG issues are long-term investment value drivers. Hence, failing
to consider these issues is not in the best interest of beneficiaries.
From a theoretical perspective, this is consistent with the enlightened value maximization theory
of Jensen (2002) which combines the classic shareholder wealth maximization proposition (Berle
& Means, 1932) with the stakeholder theory that was popularized by Freeman (1984). Stake-
holder theory states that managers should take the interests of all of the firm’s stakeholders into
account in their decision making. Specifically, managers need to pay attention to the “interests
and well-being of those who can assist or hinder the achievement of the organization’s objectives”
(Phillips, Freeman, & Wicks, 2003, p. 481). However, it is difficult to define and achieve these
organizational objectives when managers aim to satisfy the needs of a multitude of stakeholder
groups simultaneously. Jensen (2002) argues that the lack of a single-valued objective function will
lead to managerial confusion that could result in competitive failure. His solution is to combine
the well-defined corporate objective function of shareholder value maximization with the structure
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of stakeholder theory: corporations should maximize total long-term firm market value by creat-
ing and maintaining good relations with its essential stakeholders (customers, employees, financial
backers, supplies, regulators, and communities).
The enlightened value maximization theory suggests that the creation of stakeholder value is
ultimately beneficial for shareholder value: investing in material social issues leads to improved
firm financial performance. This is consistent with the current way of thinking of institutional
investors worldwide, as becomes evident when examining recent survey evidence (BNP Paribas,
2017; Callan Institute, 2018; CFA Institute, 2017; RBC Global Asset Management, 2018; Morgan
Stanley, 2018; Russell Investments, 2019; State Street Global Advisors, 2017). All survey reports
point out that a large proportion of institutional investors claims to incorporate ESG information in
their financial decision making, ranging from 43 (Callan Institute, 2018) to 80 (State Street Global
Advisors, 2017) percent of surveyed investors. More importantly, when asked about their motives
for doing so, investors frequently mention that taking ESG information into account is consistent
with their fiduciary duty and can lead to improved financial returns. Moreover, many investors use
engagement strategies, indicating that these investors do not solely aim to be value-seeking, but
also value-enhancing.3
The discussed survey results treat institutional investors as a homogeneous group while there
is heterogeneity in views regarding ESG between institutional investors from different countries.
A crucial determinant of these cross-country differences is the regulatory environment. We hy-
pothesize that institutional investors from civil law countries have a more enlightened view of value
maximization compared to institutional investors from common law countries and have several argu-
ments for this hypothesis. Most literature focuses on geography instead of legal origin, with Europe
and the US researched the most. We base our arguments on a comparison between European and
US investors. This more general comparison is valid since, in our sample, approximately 82% of
civil law institutional investors are domiciled in Europe, while approximately 92% of common law
institutional investors are domiciled in the US.
Because of their stakeholder oriented model, firms in civil law countries perceive CSR as an
internal part of business operations, which can ultimately result in a better understanding of
3The percentage of surveyed investors using engagement strategies are 26% (CFA Institute, 2017), 40% (BNP Paribas,
2017), 50% (Callan Institute, 2018), 71% (State Street Global Advisors, 2017), and 80% (Morgan Stanley, 2018).
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the financial value of CSR. For example, the system of co-determination in which employees and
trade-unions participate in firm decision-making is widespread in northern Europe and results
in a corporate responsibility for stakeholders (Jurgens et al., 2010). Matten and Moon (2008)
describe the European style as implicit CSR, which consists of values, norms, and rules that require
corporations to address stakeholder issues. Practicing implicit CSR is not a voluntary corporate
decision, but rather a reaction to a corporation’s institutional environment.
In contrast, Matten and Moon (2008) argue that CSR in the US is an explicit, deliberate,
and often strategic decision. One might argue that the strategic approach to CSR in the US,
compared to the non-voluntary conduct in Europe, implies that enlightened value maximization is
more consistent with the US approach of CSR. However, we argue that the implicit CSR system
in Europe forces corporations in these countries to collaborate with stakeholders, which ultimately
leads to greater knowledge of the potential strategic benefits of CSR. As a result, managers in
Europe are more likely to invest in CSR issues that are better linked to financial value. In several
recent survey reports, it becomes clear that this financial view of CSR is also apparent to European
institutional investors.
Survey evidence indicates that European institutional investors are more likely to believe that
ESG information is financially material for investment performance (Amel-Zadeh & Serafeim, 2017;
van Duuren et al., 2016; CFA Institute, 2017). For example, in a global sample of 126 fund
managers, 67% of European investors believe that socially responsible investing has a positive
impact on financial performance, compared to only 17% of US investors. Moreover, US investors
are more likely to doubt that taking ESG issues into account is consistent with their fiduciary duty
(Amel-Zadeh & Serafeim, 2017; CFA Institute, 2017).
Although these surveys had respondents from investors in countries outside the US and Europe,
they are not reported, or not segregated by individual countries.4 However, under the assumption
that the belief in the material importance of CSR is a result of the civil law stakeholder model,
we argue that civil law institutional investors have a more enlightened view of value maximization;
taking stakeholder interests into account by investing in CSR leads to improved firm financial value.
4CFA Institute (2017) reports the results of APAC countries. However, countries within APAC can be civil law and
common law, making it impossible to draw conclusions based on legal origin.
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C. How?
Institutional investors can influence corporate conduct using two mechanisms: (the threat of)
exit/selection and voice. Large investors can affect managerial decision making by threatening
to sell their holdings, which would drive down the price of the targeted company (Admati &
Pfleiderer, 2009). However, since Dyck et al. (2018) find that exit and selection do not lead to
significant changes in a firm’s E&S performance, we focus on the second mechanism: voice.
Shareholders can either engage publicly by immediately filing a shareholder proposal or privately
by first initiating a dialogue with the target firm. There are two reasons why our study only includes
public engagements. First, several recent studies have examined the success and impact of private
engagements (Barko, Cremers, & Renneboog, 2017; Becht, Franks, Mayer, & Rossi, 2010; Dimson
& Li, 2012, e.g.). Each of these studies utilizes a dataset that is specific to a single asset manager,
which calls into question the external validity of their findings. Second, since each shareholder with
voting rights is allowed to vote on a proposal, data on public engagements allow us to measure the
influence of foreign investors more directly.
In the US, shareholders with a minimum ownership share of one percent, or voting stock with
a minimum market value of $2,000 have the right to submit a proposal. Three possible scenarios
can occur after a proposal has been submitted: it is omitted, it is withdrawn, or it goes to a vote
at the Annual General Meeting (AGM). The process is summarized in Figure 1.
We study public engagements related to E&S issues using two outcome variables. First, we
measure success by the probability of withdrawal. When negotiation between the proposal sponsor
and firm management is successful, the sponsor voluntarily withdraws the proposal. Since the
target firm implements the desired changes, a proposal withdrawal is an indication of success
(Bauer, Moers, & Viehs, 2015). Second, we measure support from investors as the percentage of
votes cast in favor of a proposal at the AGM. We cannot simply classify a proposal with majority
support as a success since shareholder proposals are nonbinding (Tkac, 2006). However, studies
have shown that proposals do have an impact on share prices, firm performance, and other firm
characteristics such as CSR and takeover defenses, regardless of receiving a majority of votes or
not (David et al., 2007; Gillan & Starks, 2000; Grewal et al., 2016; King, Bozos, & Koutmos, 2017;
Renneboog & Szilagyi, 2009; Thomas & Cotter, 2007).
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D. Hypotheses
Bauer et al. (2015) found a significantly positive effect of institutional ownership on the prob-
ability of withdrawal when an institutional investor sponsored the proposal. Management is more
willing to negotiate with the proposal sponsor when it fears the pressure from a broader base of
institutional investors, who can use the threat of exit to exert monitoring power (Bharath, Jayara-
man, & Nagar, 2018; Edmans & Manso, 2011; McCahery, Sautner, & Starks, 2016). We separate
institutional ownership into civil law institutional ownership and common law institutional own-
ership based on each investor’s country of domicile. The results of Liang and Renneboog (2017)
indicate that investors from civil law countries are more likely to be supportive of CSR compared
to investors from common law countries. Under the assumption that management knows that civil
law investors are supportive of CSR, we expect that the positive effect of institutional ownership
on the probability of withdrawal is higher for civil law institutional ownership than common law
institutional ownership.
Hypothesis 1a: The higher the share of institutional investors in the shareholder base of a target
firm, the higher the probability of withdrawal of an environmental or social proposal.
Hypothesis 1b: The positive effect of institutional ownership on the probability of withdrawal is
higher for civil law institutional ownership than common law institutional ownership.
Investors have a more direct effect on the second outcome variable: vote support. Gillan and
Starks (2000) found a positive correlation between institutional ownership and vote support for
corporate governance proposals. Because of the evidence that institutional investors drive CSR,
we hypothesize that his finding holds for E&S proposals. However, because of their stakeholder
orientation and focus on long-term firm value, we expect the effect to be higher for civil law
institutional ownership compared to common law institutional ownership.
Hypothesis 2a: The higher the share of institutional investors in the shareholder base of a target
firm, the higher the vote support for an environmental or social proposal.
Hypothesis 2b: The positive effect of institutional ownership on vote support is higher for civil
law institutional ownership than common law institutional ownership.
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Nevertheless, shareholders that have an enlightened view of value maximization do not support
all E&S shareholder proposals. Instead, they condition their support on the proposal’s expected
financial impact. The enlightened view of value maximization implies that there is an economically
optimal level of CSR investment: a firm that underinvests in CSR does not reap the full benefits
that CSR can provide to its long-term value, a firm that overinvests in CSR results destroys firm
value because the marginal costs do not outweigh the marginal financial benefits. Under these
assumptions, investing in CSR has decreasing marginal benefits, and the relation between CSR
investments and long-term firm value is positive but concave (Flammer, 2015; Harjoto et al., 2017;
Wang, Choi, & Li, 2007).
Empirical studies show that investors have a concave relation between CSR and long-term firm
value in mind. Flammer (2011) finds that environmentally friendly (harmful) firm behavior results
in a significant stock price increase (decrease), but the effect is smaller when the firm exhibits
a high level of environmental CSR before the event. Krüger (2015) finds that investors respond
strongly negatively to news involving negative social and environmental events, whereas weakly
negatively to positive events. However, when the positive event offsets a previous run of weak CSR
behavior, investors’ reaction to positive events is significantly positive. Both papers demonstrate
that investors believe that CSR investments have decreasing marginal returns.
We expect that institutional investors are more likely to support a proposal when the CSR
of the target firm is currently below the optimal level. However, based on our discussion of the
importance of legal origin, we propose to distinguish between common law and civil law institu-
tional ownership. We hypothesize that institutional investors from civil law countries have a more
enlightened view of value maximization and base their vote support on the expected financial value
of the proposal. Common law institutional investors are less likely to support E&S shareholder
proposals (Hypothesis 2b) compared to civil law institutional investors, but when they do support
the proposal, it is likely because of a social motive.
Following the discussion on the positive concave relation between CSR investments and firm
value, we base the expected financial value of a shareholder proposal on the current level of CSR,
which we measure using an ESG score. The assumption is that a proposal aimed at a target firm
with an ex-ante low ESG score has more potential to lead to financial value compared to a proposal
aimed at a target firm with an ex-ante high ESG score.
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Hypothesis 3a: In line with an enlightened view of value maximization, the effect of civil law
institutional ownership on vote support is conditional on the ex-ante ESG score of the target firm:
there is a positive effect for low-scoring target firms, but a neutral or negative effect for high-scoring
target firms.
Hypothesis 3b: The effect of common law institutional ownership on vote support is not con-
ditional on the ex-ante ESG score of the target firm: the effect is positive or neutral for both
low-scoring and high-scoring target firms.
III. Data and Methodology
A. Shareholder proposals
The data on E&S shareholder proposals is acquired from ISS, formerly RiskMetrics. ISS covers
more than 6,000 E&S proposals aimed at S&P 1500 firms between 1997 and 2017. However, because
of data limitations, our analysis covers all proposals between 2000 and 2013.5 The data includes
each proposal’s status (omitted, withdrawn, or voted), sponsor type (company, fund, religious
organization, special interest group, SRI fund, union, individual, or other) and vote for percentage.
It also includes a one-line description of the proposal topic. We grouped all proposals into six
main categories (business model and innovation, environment, human capital, social capital, other)
and several subcategories, based on their description. Appendix A provides an overview of all E&S
proposals between 1997 and 2017 per main category and subcategory.
B. Institutional ownership, CSR, and firm controls
We use Factset to obtain institutional ownership data grouped by country of domicile at the
end of the previous calendar year.6 Information on the legal origin of each country is obtained from
La Porta et al. (1998). These two sources are combined to calculate institutional ownership by
legal origin. We focus on common law and civil law countries and do not distinguish between the
5Institutional ownership data from Factset is only available after 2000. MSCI KLD data cannot be used after 2012
because they changed their rating methodology, proposals in 2013 are still included in the analyses since we lag
KLD scores by one year.
6Ownership data at, or close to, the annual general meeting date is often not available.
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different types of civil law (French, German, and Scandinavian) because the average percentage of
civil law institutional ownership in US firms is low (Table I). Dividing this into smaller subgroups
would lead to too little variation.
We assess firm performance on ESG issues by using the KLD STATS from MSCI, formerly
RiskMetrics. The MSCI ESG KLD STATS includes annual data of positive and negative ESG
performance indicators for a broad universe of publicly traded US firms. Over 140 research experts
assess these indicators by collecting data from several sources: macro data from academic, gov-
ernment, or NGO datasets, company disclosure (10-K, sustainability reports, proxy reports, AGM
results), government databases, media, and other stakeholder sources.
The data covers 44 positive indicators (strengths) and 38 negative indicators (concerns) in seven
qualitative issue areas: community, corporate governance, diversity, employee relations, environ-
ment, human rights, and product. For each indicator, a firm is assigned a rating of 1 whenever it
has a strength or concern in that issue, and 0 otherwise. It is common to calculate a total KLD
score by subtracting the total number of concerns from the total number of strengths (David et al.,
2007; Grewal et al., 2016; Hillman & Keim, 2001; Statman & Glushkov, 2009). However, Mattingly
and Berman (2006) find that positive and negative social action are empirically and conceptually
distinct and should not be combined. Following their recommendation, we treat KLD strengths
and KLD concerns as separate variables in our regressions. For completeness, we also show the
results for the total score.
In recent years, there have been two significant changes in the KLD dataset. First, in 2010,
MSCI started using an industry-based key issue rating model. In this model, firms are assessed for
typically 4-7 indicators that relate to the most material issues within the firm’s primary industry.
Before the implementation of this model, RiskMetrics evaluated all firms on the full set of indicators.
We tested whether this had an impact on our results by weighing KLD scores by the amount of
examined indicators; it did not change any of our conclusions. Second, KLD STATS used to be
owned by RiskMetrics but got acquired by MSCI in 2010. MSCI changed the methodology of KLD
STATS in 2013, making scores before and after this change incomparable. To account for this, we
only include KLD data before 2013 in our study.
We obtain firm control variables from Compustat: total assets, the price to book ratio, capital
expenditures, the return on assets, sales growth, the total amount of dividends, and the debt to
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equity ratio.7 Furthermore, we retrieve the total q ratio of Peters and Taylor (2017). All firm
control variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
C. Methodology
To test hypothesis 1 we use a logistic regression with the probability of withdrawal (Withdrawn)
as the dependent variable. The main independent variable of interest is institutional ownership
(InstOwn); the percentage of shares outstanding owned by institutional investors. For hypothesis
1b, we split InstOwn into civil law institutional ownership (Civil) and common law institutional
ownership (Common) based on the legal origin in each institutional investor’s country of domicile.
This results in the following regression models for proposal i at firm j in year t:
Withdrawnijt = β0 + β1InstOwnjt + β2KLDST Rjt−1 + β3KLDCONjt−1 + β4Πijt
+ β5Xjt−1 + Λ
(1)
Withdrawnijt = β0 + β1Civiljt + β2Commonjt + β3KLDST Rjt−1 + β4KLDCONjt−1
+ β5Πijt + β6Xjt−1 + Λ
(2)
KLDST Rjt−1(KLDCONjt−1) is the total sum of strengths (concerns) across all KLD’s qualitative
issue areas except corporate governance.8 We lag the KLD score by one year to assure that it was
not affected by the proposal. Πijt is a set of proposal level control variables: proposal sponsor,
proposal type, and a Repeat dummy equal to 1 when the proposal was filed in the previous year by
the same sponsor at the same firm, and equal to 0 otherwise.9 Xjt−1 is a set of firm-level control
variables: log of total assets, log of the price to book ratio, log of capital expenditures, ROA, sales
growth, the total amount of dividends, the total q ratio (Peters & Taylor, 2017), and the debt to
equity ratio. Λ denotes year and Fama-French 49 industry fixed effects. Although fixed effects in
a non-linear model can be troublesome, Greene (2002) shows that the bias drops dramatically as
the group size increases to 3 or more, which is the case in our data. Moreover, we tested a linear
7Stock prices for the calculation of the price to book ratio are obtained from CRSP.
8Excluding corporate governance issues ensures that the score is only based on E&S issues. Including corporate
governance in the scores leads to almost identical results.
9The SEC set thresholds that allow for re-submission of proposals in ensuing years. The target firm can only exclude
proposals that did not attain 3% of support the first time, 6% the second time, and 10% the third time that it was
presented and voted on at the AGM.
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probability model and our results were consistent. Lastly, since a target firm can receive several
proposals in one year, we treat each proposal as a separate observation but cluster standard errors
at the firm level.
Voting outcomes are tested using the fractional logit model (Papke & Wooldridge, 1996), which
ensures that the predicted voting outcome is between 0 and 100 percent. Hypothesis 2 is tested using
the same specification as equations 1 and 2 while we estimate the following model for hypothesis 3:
E(V oteijt|x) = G(β0 + β1Civiljt + β2Commonjt + β3Civiljt ×KLDST Rjt−1 + β4Civiljt×
KLDCONjt−1 + β5Commonjt ×KLDST Rjt−1 + β6Commonjt ×KLDCONjt−1+
β7KLDST Rjt−1 + β8KLDCONjt−1 + β9Πijt + β10Xjt−1 + Λ)
(3)
where G(·) is the logistic function. We expect a negative interaction effect between KLDST R
and Civil and a positive interaction effect between KLDCON and Civil.
Calculating and interpreting interaction effects in non-linear models is not straightforward. The
marginal effect of Civil on vote support is not only dependent on KLDST R and KLDCON but also
on all other independent variables (Ai & Norton, 2003). Hence, the coefficient of the interaction
term is not sufficiently informative on the size and significance of this marginal effect. We solve
this by calculating and graphing average marginal effects at different levels of KLD strengths and
concerns (Greene, 2010; Karaca-Mandic, Norton, & Dowd, 2012; Iliev, Lins, Miller, & Roth, 2015).
IV. Environmental and Social Shareholder Proposals
Table II provides an overview of all proposals in the sample categorized by subtopic. The
number of E&S proposal filings has increased over the years, but there is no stable trend. There
is a large variety of topics, but the most popular topics are “GHG emissions,” “diversity and
inclusion,” “management of the legal and regulatory environment,” “human rights,” and “report
on sustainability.” Several observations emerge from the outcomes of these proposals (Table III).
First, the percentage of votes in favor has increased substantially over time - from 6.73% in 1997
to 21.38% in 2017 - which indicates that investors are increasingly supportive of E&S proposals.
However, support is still much lower compared to corporate governance proposals, which on average
receive well over 30 percent of votes for since 2000 (Gine & Guadalupe, 2012; Renneboog & Szilagyi,
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2011). Second, the probability of withdrawal is on average 30.2% and has not increased over time.
Proposals related to human capital or the environment are most likely, while proposals addressing
the firm’s business model are least likely to be withdrawn. Proposals related to the business model
might be too specific or intrusive, which would also explain their low percentage of vote support.
Third, proposals seldom receive majority support, although the percentage of proposals receiving
majority support has increased over time.
A. The probability of withdrawal
We empirically examine two engagement outcomes: the probability of proposal withdrawal and
vote support.10 After a sponsor files a proposal, the sponsor often enters into negotiations with
management. When management is favorable towards the issues addressed in the proposal, they
will reach an agreement with the proposal sponsor, who then withdraws the proposal.
Table IV presents the results of estimating equations (1) and (2) using both the logit model
and the linear probability model. Hypothesis 1a is not rejected since we find a significantly positive
effect of institutional ownership on the probability of withdrawal. A 1 percentage point increase in
institutional ownership increases the probability of withdrawal by 0.33 percentage points. Hence,
firm managers are more likely to negotiate favorably with the sponsor when a higher share of
institutional investors owns the firm. Firm managers might be aware of the importance of CSR for
institutional investors and know that these investors are more likely to support E&S proposals at
the AGM. Moreover, successful negotiations prevent the firm from having to present the proposal
at the public meeting, saving it from a potential negative impact on its reputation.
Alternatively, one could argue that institutional investors are just more likely to invest in firms
that are more supportive of CSR and that the significantly positive coefficient is purely correla-
tional. However, Dyck et al. (2018) provide evidence of a causal relationship between institutional
ownership and a firm’s E&S performance. Hence, these investors do not merely invest in firms
that have a good track record of E&S behavior, but actively influence it. Moreover, the results
in Table IV indicate that the probability of withdrawal is not significantly higher when the target
firm has a higher ESG score.
Models (3), (4), and (6) distinguish between civil law and common law institutional investors.
10We define vote support as the percentage of votes in favor of a proposal at the AGM.
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Following hypothesis 1b we find a higher coefficient for Civil compared to Common. However, we
reject hypothesis 1b because the effect of Civil on the probability of withdrawal is not significant.
The regression results also indicate that the type of sponsor is important. Compared to individ-
uals, larger sponsors like public pensions and (SRI) funds are more likely to successfully negotiate
with the target firm. For example, the probability of withdrawal is 36.4 percentage points higher
when the sponsor is a public pension instead of an individual. These findings are consistent with
Bauer et al. (2015) who study CSR, as well as corporate governance, proposals.
B. Vote Support
Table VI shows the regression results for vote support, where models 1 to 3 use ordinary
least squares and models 4 to 6 use the fractional logit model. There is a significantly positive
effect of Civil on vote support in all specifications which is much higher compared to Common.
A 1 percentage point increase in Civil (Common) increases the percentage of votes for by 0.66
(0.06) percentage points (Specification 4). Hence, civil law institutional investors are more likely
to support CSR issues compared to their common law counterparts. Even though the average
percentage of civil law institutional ownership is low, its economic impact is meaningful. Using the
results of model (4) and keeping all other variables at their means, an increase in Civil from its 25th
percentile to its 75th percentile increases the predicted percentage of votes for by 1.73 percentage
points (12.52 percent).11
To test hypothesis 3, we use equation (3) and interact Civil and Common with the KLD scores.
Specifications (2) and (5) in Table VI reveal that there is a significantly negative interaction effect
between Civil and the KLD strengths score. This result also holds for the total KLD score (the
sum of strengths minus the sum of concerns). However, because we use a non-linear model, the
marginal effect of Civil on vote support is not only dependent on KLDST R but also on all other
independent variables (Ai & Norton, 2003). Hence, the coefficient of the interaction term is not
sufficiently informative on the size and significance of this marginal effect. Following Greene (2010);
Karaca-Mandic et al. (2012); Iliev et al. (2015) we solve this by calculating and graphing average
marginal effects of Civil and Common on vote support at different levels of KLD scores in Figure 2.
11We used the percentiles of Civil in our proposal sample to calculate these results. When the S&P 1500 sample is
used the predicted percentage of votes for increases by 1.37 percentage points (9.91 percent).
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The shaded area around each line represents the 95 percent confidence interval.
Panels (a) and (b) make clear that the marginal effects of Civil are much larger compared to
Common. Panel (a) shows that there is a strong and positive marginal effect of Civil at low levels
of KLD strengths, but the effect turns negative at high levels of KLD strengths. This pattern is not
observed in any specification for Common. Under our assumption that the expected financial value
of a proposal decreases as the ESG score of a firm increases, we can infer that civil law institutional
investors are more likely to support CSR issues because of financial rather than social reasons,
compared to investors from common law countries. Hence, hypothesis 3 is not rejected.
To further clarify the impact of these findings, Figure 3 shows the predicted percentage of vote
support for different levels of Civil/Common and KLD strengths, keeping all other variables fixed
at their means. Panel (a) clearly shows that the effect of Civil on vote support highly depends on
the number of KLD strengths at the target firm. In contrast, the relation between Common and
vote support in panel (b) does not notably change depending on the number of KLD strengths.
There is a direct negative effect of KLD strengths on vote support in this panel, but this is a result
of its interaction with Civil. To account for this, in panels (c) and (d) we restrict the percentage
of institutional ownership of the alternative legal origin to zero. As a result, panel (d) shows that
there is less of a distinction in predicted outcomes as the amount of KLD strengths changes.
Panels (e) and (f) of Figure 2 show the results for KLD concerns. There is a positive relationship
between the marginal effect of Civil and the number of concerns, but the marginal effects are never
significant. For Common we observe a significantly positive marginal effect on vote support at low
levels of concerns, but not at high levels of concerns. When deducting the sum of strengths from
the sum of concerns in panels (g) and (h), we observe the same patterns as for the strengths score.
The only noticeable difference is that the marginal effect of Civil on vote support is not significantly
negative at high levels of the total score.
Overall, we find that institutional ownership has a positive effect on both the probability of
withdrawal and the vote support for CSR proposals. When distinguishing between civil law and
common law institutional ownership, there is no significant positive relation between Civil and the
probability of withdrawal. However, when looking at shareholder support for CSR proposals, we
find that institutional investors from civil law countries are more likely to support these engagements
compared to common law institutional investors. The negative interaction between Civil and the
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KLD strengths and total scores indicates that their motive for doing so relates more to financial
rather than social value.
V. Additional Considerations
A. ESG data
To assess whether our results are robust depending on the source of ESG data that is used, we
obtain data from MSCI ESG. In a recently conducted global survey asking sustainability profes-
sionals about their views on ESG ratings, MSCI ESG ratings is second most frequently mentioned
as highest quality rating (SustainAbility, 2019). MSCI uses company disclosures, government and
academic databases, and media sources to assess 6,800 companies worldwide. They identify mate-
rial risks and opportunities for each industry through a quantitative model, resulting in a selection
of key issues.
These key issues are weighted based on their expected time frame to materialize and their
expected impact. For each company, the weighted averages of the key issue scores are aggregated
and normalized by their industry. Ultimately, this results in an industry adjusted score for each
company that corresponds to a rating between best (AAA) and worst (CC). Besides this industry
adjusted score, we calculate an E&S score based on the environmental and social pillar scores and
their weights. Note that this E&S score is not industry adjusted because MSCI does not provide
industry adjusted environmental and social pillar scores.
Table VII reports the logistic regression results for the probability of withdrawal, replacing the
KLD by the MSCI ESG scores. Compared to table IV, there are less observations because MSCI
scores are not available before 2007. This might explain why the effect of Civil is significantly
positive in this analysis, but not in the previous analysis using MSCI KLD; the influence of civil
law institutional investors has increased over time. The results indicate that a one percentage point
increase in Civil increases the probability of withdrawal by 2.38 percentage points, while a similar
increase in Common increases this probability by 0.40 percentage points.
In table VIII there is a significantly positive effect of both Civil and Common on vote support,
but the effect is much larger for Civil. Moreover, there are significantly negative interaction effects
between Civil/Common and the industry adjusted MSCI ESG score, and a significantly negative
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interaction effect between Civil and the MSCI E&S score. Figure VIII provides a better illustration
of these interaction effects. The results are similar to the interaction between Civil and the KLD
scores; there is a positive effect of Civil at low levels, and a negative effect at high levels, of industry
adjusted MSCI ESG on vote support. Overall, this indicates that our results are robust to using a
different measure of ESG.
B. Materiality
We base the expected financial value of a shareholder proposal on the current ESG score and
assume that a proposal aimed at a target firm with an ex-ante low ESG score has more potential
to lead to financial value compared to a proposal aimed at a target firm with an ex-ante high ESG
score. Alternatively, following Grewal et al. (2016) and Schopohl (2017), we could classify each
proposal as being material or immaterial according to the materiality standards of the Sustainabil-
ity Accounting Standards Board (SASB). The SEC requires the disclosure of material information,
which they define as “information that is necessary to form an understanding of the company’s
financial condition and operating performance, as well as its prospects for the future” (SEC, 2003).
SASB intends to assist companies in fulfilling these regulatory requirements by identifying sus-
tainability topics that are likely to be material to investors in each specific industry, warranting
their inclusion for standardized disclosures. To achieve this, SASB’s analysts follow industry news,
perform independent research, and discuss their research with top firms and investment analysts
within each industry sector. The results of this process are summarized in the SASB Materiality
Map, which shows for each sector and industry which sustainability topics are material.
We use SASB’s materiality map, the assigned subcategory (Table II), and the industry of the
target firm to classify each proposal as either material or immaterial. We find that only 33.4 percent
of the proposals in our sample is material, which is lower compared to the findings of Grewal et al.
(2016, 42 percent) and Schopohl (2017, 44 percent). To test whether material proposals are more
likely to be withdrawn and receive higher vote support, we include a Material dummy which is equal
to 1 when the proposal is material, and 0 when it is immaterial. Moreover, to test the hypothesis
that institutional investors from civil law countries are more likely to support CSR engagements
because of financial instead of social motives, compared to institutional investors from common law
countries, we include interactions between Civil/Common and Material. The results are reported
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in Table IX.
We find no significant effect of Material or its interaction with Civil and Common in any of
the specifications. Finding an effect depends on two factors: the correctness of the materiality
classification, and whether shareholders share the same view of materiality with SASB. Following
Grewal et al. (2016) and Schopohl (2017), the materiality of each proposal is determined based
on the short proposal description provided by ISS.12 Even though a proposal topic is material
based on the SASB materiality map, the actual proposal content might not be material. Analyzing
the detailed proxy statement of each proposal to determine materiality goes beyond the scope of
this paper and is left for future research. The second complication is that our results depend
on the beliefs of shareholders concerning the materiality of E&S issues, which are likely to be
different compared to SASB. For instance, only 17% of the respondents of the CFA survey aimed
at portfolio managers and research analysts indicated that they used SASB to identify material
ESG issues (CFA Institute, 2017). Moreover, institutional investors from civil law countries are
less familiar with SASB because it is a US-based organization.
C. Proxy advisors
Institutional investors hold a large number of securities and take therefore part in a substantial
amount of proxy meetings. Since informed voting at all of these meetings entails costs, institutional
investors use the services of proxy advisors. The leading player in the proxy advising market
is Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), with Glass Lewis (GL) as its main competitor (Li,
2018). Their services include the provision of research, assisting investors in developing their voting
guidelines, and offering vote recommendations for each proposal on a company’s proxy statement
(Choi, Fisch, & Kahan, 2010). As a result, proxy advisors have a considerable influence on voting
outcomes (Aggarwal et al., 2014; Gillan & Bethel, 2002; Cai, Garner, & Walkling, 2009; Ertimur
et al., 2013). For example, Ertimur et al. (2013) find 24.7% (12.9%) more votes against say on pay
proposals following negative ISS (GL) recommendations.
To account for the influence that proxy advisors might have on CSR related proposals, we
obtain ISS and GL vote recommendations from ProxyInsight. There are two limitations to this
12Grewal et al. (2016) add even another level of uncertainty by first mapping the proposal topic to a KLD data item
and then mapping the KLD data item to SASB’s framework. This potentially explains their inconsistent findings
in comparison to Schopohl (2017)
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data. First, coverage starts in 2011, which given our sample, only provides us with three years
of data. Second, ProxyInsight does not observe ISS recommendations directly but infers it from
the voting behavior and stated voting rationale of investors which are known to be ISS’ clients.
Ultimately, we end up with a relatively small sample of 185 proposals, of which both the ISS and
GL recommendations are provided.
In Table X, we include separate indicators for the ISS and GL recommendations, as well as
an interaction term equal to 1 when both ISS and GL recommend voting for (Choi et al., 2010).
ISS Rec (GL Rec) measures the effect of a vote for recommendation by ISS (GL) when GL (SS)
recommends to vote against. The sum of ISS Rec (GL Rec) and ISS Rec × GL Rec measures the
impact of ISS (GL) on vote support when both ISS and GL recommend voting for.
ISS Rec and GL Rec are significantly positive, indicating that both proxy advisors influence
voting outcomes. Using specification (5), the average marginal effect of a positive ISS recommenda-
tion equals 22.25 percentage points when GL has a negative recommendation, and 19.77 percentage
points when GL also has a positive recommendation. In comparison, the average marginal effect
of a positive GL recommendation amounts to 7.75 percentage points when ISS recommends voting
against, and 5.27 percentage points when ISS also recommends to vote for. These findings illustrate
that both ISS and GL have significant power to shift votes.
After correcting for proxy advisor recommendations, Figure 5 provides the marginal effects of
Civil and Common on vote support at different levels of KLD strengths, concerns, and the total
KLD score. In comparison to Figure 2, we observe nearly the same patterns for KLD strengths and
the total KLD score. However, the marginal effects of Civil are larger after correcting for proxy
advisor recommendations, but they are less significant at higher levels of KLD strengths. Moreover,
there is now a significantly negative effect when the KLD total score is high, which is not observed
in Figure 2. The most striking difference between the two figures is the newly observed positive
interaction between Civil and KLD concerns. Hence, civil law institutional investors are more likely
to support a CSR proposal when the target firm has a higher amount of CSR related concerns.
We have to be careful with the interpretation of these results since we only include a very
small subsample of E&S proposals. Table XI displays the results for this small subsample without
including proxy recommendations. All of our main findings in Table VI remain robust. However, we
do find that there is a minimal significant negative interaction between KLD strengths and Common
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in the OLS model, but not in the fractional logit model. Moreover, there is a significant negative
interaction between the total KLD score and Common in both models but the economic significance
is small: the effect of one additional percentage point common law institutional ownership on vote
support ranges from 0.07 percentage points at a total KLD score of -18, to 0.04 percentage points
at a total KLD score of -4. There is no significant marginal effect of Common on vote support at
higher total KLD scores.
VI. Conclusion
Institutional investors drive CSR around the world (Dyck et al., 2018). We empirically examine
public shareholder engagements as a potential mechanism for doing so. Additionally, we take
a closer look at which institutional investors are the driving force behind Dyck et al.’s (2018)
finding. In light of Liang and Renneboog’s (2017) conclusion that legal origin is the most important
determinant of CSR adoption, we base our analysis on the distinction between institutional investors
domiciled in civil law countries from those that are domiciled in common law countries. Lastly, we
study institutional investor’s underlying motive for driving CSR by distinguishing financial from
social motives.
Using data on approximately 2,500 E&S shareholder proposals, we show that a one percentage
point increase in civil (common) law institutional ownership increases the percentage of votes in
favor of US E&S proposals by 0.66 (0.06) percentage points. Hence, we conclude that institutional
investors from civil law countries use their voting power to positively influence the CSR of common
law firms. It is unclear what the exact impact of an increase in vote support is. Although Grewal
et al. (2016) find that environmental shareholder proposals improve the performance of the target
firm on the focal ESG issue, they did not test whether this is dependent on the percentage of vote
support.
We explore institutional investor’s motive for supporting CSR by interacting the ownership
variables with the target firm’s ESG score. Based on the evidence of decreasing marginal benefits
of CSR investments (Flammer, 2015; Harjoto et al., 2017; Wang et al., 2007), we assume that the
expected financial value of a proposal decreases as the ESG score of the target firm increases. We
find that institutional investors from civil law countries support E&S proposals when the target
26
firm has an ex-ante low ESG score, but do not support these proposals when the ex-ante ESG score
of the target firm is high. We do not find a significant negative interaction effect between common
law institutional ownership and the target firm’s ESG score on vote support. These results indicate
that the support of civil law institutional investors for CSR is more motivated by financial, rather
than social reasons.
We contribute to the literature on CSR and shareholder activism by showing that institutional
investors have a significantly positive effect on vote support for E&S proposals; previous studies
did not find any significant relation (Schopohl, 2017; Thomas & Cotter, 2007). Furthermore, we
find that civil law institutional investors have an economically meaningful positive impact on the
success of public shareholder engagements. We also add to the literature on investor’s motives
for investing socially responsible. Riedl and Smeets (2017) find that social preferences explain the
socially responsible investment decision for individual investors and Dyck et al. (2018) find that
social norms play an important role in this decision of institutional investors. In contrast, we find
show financial motives play an important role, but only for institutional investors from civil law
countries. Lastly, we contribute to the literature on corporate ownership and CSR. We demonstrate
that civil law institutional investors aim to improve the CSR performance of US firms by using their
right to vote on shareholder proposals. Hence, there is a potential positive relationship between
civil law institutional ownership of US firms and the firm’s CSR performance.
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Table I: Summary statistics - target firms
The table provides summary statistics for the independent variables that are included in our regressions. The sample
only includes targeted firms in the S&P1500 between 2000 and 2013. Variable definitions are given in appendix A1.
Mean SD Pct25 Pct50 Pct75 Min Max
Vote 13.81 12.55 5.70 8.40 21.40 0.00 98.00
Civil 2.98 1.47 1.91 2.78 3.94 0.02 12.53
Common 64.59 15.14 53.70 64.51 76.23 15.85 98.61
KLDST R 5.30 4.05 2.00 5.00 8.00 0.00 21.00
KLDCON 6.38 3.94 3.00 6.00 9.00 0.00 19.00
KLDT OT -1.08 4.66 -4.00 -1.00 2.00 -14.00 18.00
ln(totalassets) 10.09 1.49 9.12 10.19 10.95 5.05 13.42
ln(pricetobook) 1.09 0.68 0.61 1.06 1.49 -1.23 3.09
ln(capex) 6.98 1.63 5.87 7.11 8.00 0.32 9.65
ROA 7.27 6.24 3.33 6.87 11.02 -30.27 26.64
Salesgrowth 7.73 18.31 0.09 6.30 13.64 -45.13 108.16
Dividends 1554.95 2219.98 92.44 482.00 1909.00 0.00 7628.00
Tobin’s q 1.31 1.38 0.63 0.94 1.55 -1.58 18.11
Debt/equity 2.27 2.83 0.96 1.46 2.52 -4.76 20.88
N 2829
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Table II: Number of filed US E&S proposals
The table reports the number of filed public shareholder proposals targeting US firms between 1997 and 2017. Proposals are divided into six main categories,
each including several subtopics.
Proposal Topics
Year ’97 ’98 ’99 ’00 ’01 ’02 ’03 ’04 ’05 ’06 ’07 ’08 ’09 ’10 ’11 ’12 ’13 ’14 ’15 ’16 ’17 Total
Business Model and Innovation 0 0 0 22 17 14 12 8 14 10 8 2 1 0 1 1 6 7 5 1 0 129
Product design and lifecycle management 22 17 14 12 8 14 8 7 2 1 1 1 6 7 5 1 126
Supply chain management 2 1 3
Environment 68 66 55 40 45 64 65 63 68 59 76 60 42 44 38 43 44 72 64 87 69 1179
Air quality 1 7 2 2 2 1 1 16
Ceres principles 38 30 17 11 9 7 2 114
Climate change 10 30 12 6 15 14 5 6 13 12 26 30 179
Ecological impacts 7 6 7 4 3 8 8 7 7 5 3 7 3 4 1 2 82
Energy management 6 4 3 1 8 7 4 3 3 13 16 12 13 5 8 13 15 11 9 25 7 186
GHG emissions 4 1 2 3 17 20 15 25 9 13 22 14 15 10 8 7 35 32 23 24 299
Report on climate change 10 10 9 6 2 1 6 6 50
Report on environment 3 4 3 2 8 3 2 2 1 28
Waste and hazardous materials management 7 6 12 9 11 19 12 7 10 1 3 4 1 2 5 7 7 6 4 7 6 146
Water and wastewater management 2 1 7 5 6 6 5 1 33
Other environment 3 4 1 1 14 9 1 3 2 1 4 1 1 1 46
Human Capital 64 56 56 71 95 101 79 71 80 63 43 39 25 53 42 37 20 19 52 40 53 1159
Employee engagement, diversity and inclusion 38 28 19 29 25 33 31 29 44 49 34 34 22 49 38 31 19 18 48 35 51 704
Employee health and safety 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 4 6 1 1 4 5 2 34
Labor practices 25 26 37 41 69 67 46 41 35 14 9 5 3 3 421
Leadership and Governance 13 14 17 16 19 12 13 54 42 40 48 49 49 54 74 107 131 130 119 96 89 1186
Business ethics 4 5 8 7 8 5 9 11 4 5 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 5 82
Critical incident risk management 2 1 1 2 1 3 6 3 2 1 22
Management of the legal and regulatory environment 9 9 9 9 11 7 4 43 38 38 47 43 48 51 72 102 123 125 116 94 84 1082
Social Capital 84 63 52 46 42 47 71 70 58 78 88 103 104 77 78 53 51 56 60 51 67 1399
Access and affordability 7 4 9 13 12 17 3 10 3 4 4 4 5 4 8 107
Charitable giving 2 8 2 1 1 11 8 1 34
Customer privacy 1 1 1 3
Customer welfare 13 3 2 2 2 2 3 1 10 9 3 1 1 3 3 2 1 61
Data security 2 5 4 6 7 4 2 5 10 10 3 2 60
Human rights and community relations 26 22 14 10 9 7 24 22 20 44 36 43 28 51 51 33 31 36 35 39 43 624
Product quality and safety 6 4 1 1 1 1 1 2 6 12 3 6 3 12 8 4 8 7 9 95
Selling practices and product labeling 30 22 25 22 18 18 29 25 31 16 20 15 25 12 10 6 6 3 4 337
Other social capital 1 8 25 39 5 78
Other 35 45 13 25 14 28 31 17 37 132 147 93 56 77 55 51 71 84 70 46 47 1227
Anti-social proposal 11 8 21 7 9 10 9 6 17 12 11 7 128
Charitable giving 10 21 2 10 5 8 16 6 2 8 11 4 2 6 2 3 1 5 122
Environment 3 3
Establish sustainability committee 1 2 2 1 11 9 11 7 4 48
Military 6 10 16 7 4 3 3 3 1 53
Product design and lifecycle management 1 1 1 2 1 3 8 28 27 21 26 17 24 17 16 11 5 8 3 5 225
Report on sustainability 1 14 22 16 21 36 24 18 31 21 25 38 40 23 11 16 357
Social proposal 53 61 1 5 1 3 5 10 10 10 9 168
Other 25 23 10 14 7 19 12 3 7 3 123
Total 264 244 193 220 232 266 271 283 299 382 410 348 278 305 288 292 323 368 370 321 326 6279
Table III: Summary statistics - proposal outcomes
The table presents summary statistics of all E&S shareholder proposals between 1997 and 2017. Because of data
limitations, all future samples only include proposals between 2000 and 2013. Omitted is the percentage of proposals
that are omitted. Withdrawn is the percentage of proposals that are withdrawn. Voted is the percentage of proposals
that went to a vote at the AGM. Vote is the average percentage of votes in favor of a proposal. Vote>50 is the
percentage of proposals that reached a percentage of votes for of 50% or higher. Vote> 10 is the percentage of
proposals that reached a percentage of 10% or higher. Strengths measures the sum of KLD strengths, Concerns
measures the sum of KLD concerns, and Total KLD measures the overall KLD score which is calculated by deducting
the sum of concerns from the sum of strengths. Percentiles are calculated based on the scores in each specific year.
Omitted Withdrawn Voted Vote Vote>50 Vote>10
Year
1997 35.20% 30.30% 34.50% 6.73% 0.00% 19.80%
1998 38.90% 20.90% 40.20% 7.71% 0.00% 24.50%
1999 21.80% 24.40% 53.90% 7.94% 1.00% 22.10%
2000 18.20% 24.10% 57.70% 6.99% 0.00% 15.00%
2001 13.80% 27.20% 59.10% 8.74% 0.70% 32.80%
2002 11.70% 33.50% 54.90% 9.09% 0.70% 27.40%
2003 17.30% 35.80% 46.90% 11.11% 0.80% 34.60%
2004 16.60% 24.70% 58.70% 11.25% 1.80% 38.60%
2005 16.70% 31.10% 52.20% 9.56% 0.60% 28.20%
2006 11.80% 21.50% 66.80% 12.34% 0.80% 33.70%
2007 14.10% 23.40% 62.40% 14.20% 1.60% 43.00%
2008 16.10% 31.60% 52.30% 14.24% 1.10% 40.70%
2009 11.20% 31.70% 57.20% 16.81% 1.30% 49.10%
2010 11.10% 34.80% 54.10% 18.02% 0.60% 51.50%
2011 13.90% 34.70% 51.40% 19.92% 2.00% 56.80%
2012 14.00% 34.90% 51.00% 19.13% 0.70% 62.40%
2013 11.10% 33.40% 55.40% 21.44% 2.20% 62.00%
2014 12.80% 37.50% 49.70% 22.32% 2.70% 69.40%
2015 13.50% 37.80% 48.60% 21.05% 0.00% 67.20%
2016 10.30% 28.70% 61.10% 21.93% 3.60% 64.30%
2017 17.50% 28.50% 54.00% 21.38% 2.30% 67.60%
Total 16.01% 30.20% 53.79% 15.08% 1.27% 45.41%
Proposal Type
Business model 3.90% 19.40% 76.70% 6.70% 0.00% 12.10%
Environment 11.60% 36.00% 52.40% 16.13% 0.90% 50.60%
Human capital 16.20% 37.40% 46.40% 15.22% 2.60% 53.80%
Leadership 8.30% 25.00% 66.70% 21.89% 1.60% 70.70%
Social capital 20.20% 28.40% 51.40% 10.80% 0.60% 28.20%
Other 24.40% 25.80% 49.80% 11.30% 1.00% 24.70%
Strengths
<25 pct 10.75% 35.19% 54.06% 17.31% 2.44% 53.23%
25-75 pct 13.69% 28.68% 57.64% 12.98% 0.59% 38.27%
>75 pct 19.45% 26.32% 54.22% 9.64% 0.00% 26.12%
Concerns
< 25 pct 10.40% 38.39% 51.21% 15.09% 1.93% 46.23%
25-75 pct 15.32% 29.51% 55.17% 12.69% 0.86% 34.94%
> 75 pct 16.23% 19.00% 64.77% 13.60% 0.21% 43.68%
Total KLD
< 25 pct 11.75% 26.92% 61.33% 15.83% 1.85% 46.52%
25-75 pct 13.82% 32.17% 54.01% 13.66% 0.74% 42.04%
> 75 pct 17.45% 30.08% 52.47% 9.69% 0.26% 25.39%
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Table IV: Probability of withdrawal
The table shows which firm and proposal characteristics determine the probability of a proposal being withdrawn.
The dependent variable in all models is Withdrawn, which equals 1 when the proposal is withdrawn, and 0 if not.
Variable definitions are given in appendix A1. Columns (1)-(4) report the results of logistic regressions. Since we
include year, Fama-French 49 industry, and proposal type fixed effects, we display linear probability models in columns
(5) and (6). Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote statistical significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Logit Logit Logit Logit LPM LPM
InstOwn 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.001)
Civil 0.061 0.061 0.014
(0.053) (0.052) (0.011)
Common 0.014∗∗ 0.013∗∗ 0.003∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.001)
KLDST R 0.031 0.031 0.005 0.005
(0.023) (0.023) (0.005) (0.004)
KLDCON -0.009 -0.008 -0.000 -0.000
(0.024) (0.024) (0.005) (0.005)
KLDT OT 0.021 0.021
(0.016) (0.016)
Company 0.995 0.989 1.025 1.019 0.132 0.137
(0.802) (0.801) (0.806) (0.805) (0.119) (0.119)
Fund 1.240∗∗∗ 1.240∗∗∗ 1.242∗∗∗ 1.242∗∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗
(0.403) (0.401) (0.405) (0.403) (0.067) (0.067)
Publicpension 1.704∗∗∗ 1.697∗∗∗ 1.707∗∗∗ 1.700∗∗∗ 0.281∗∗∗ 0.281∗∗∗
(0.316) (0.315) (0.316) (0.315) (0.046) (0.046)
Religious 1.633∗∗∗ 1.629∗∗∗ 1.636∗∗∗ 1.632∗∗∗ 0.254∗∗∗ 0.254∗∗∗
(0.328) (0.328) (0.329) (0.329) (0.047) (0.047)
Specialinterest 0.607∗ 0.614∗ 0.623∗ 0.630∗ 0.077 0.079
(0.362) (0.360) (0.364) (0.362) (0.052) (0.052)
SRIfund 1.663∗∗∗ 1.658∗∗∗ 1.667∗∗∗ 1.662∗∗∗ 0.272∗∗∗ 0.272∗∗∗
(0.298) (0.297) (0.298) (0.298) (0.043) (0.043)
Union 1.496∗∗∗ 1.498∗∗∗ 1.500∗∗∗ 1.502∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗
(0.399) (0.398) (0.399) (0.398) (0.075) (0.074)
Other 0.845∗∗ 0.833∗∗ 0.852∗∗ 0.841∗∗ 0.111∗ 0.112∗
(0.410) (0.410) (0.412) (0.412) (0.061) (0.061)
ln(totalassets) -0.175 -0.158 -0.193 -0.175 -0.037 -0.041
(0.137) (0.135) (0.137) (0.136) (0.028) (0.028)
ln(pricetobook) 0.007 0.007 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.148) (0.148) (0.147) (0.147) (0.029) (0.029)
ln(capex) 0.129 0.134 0.123 0.127 0.026 0.024
(0.120) (0.119) (0.120) (0.119) (0.024) (0.024)
ROA 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.011 0.002 0.002
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.002) (0.002)
Salesgrowth 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Dividends -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tobin’s -0.062 -0.065 -0.064 -0.067 -0.012 -0.013
(0.066) (0.066) (0.067) (0.067) (0.012) (0.012)
Debt/Equity -0.005 -0.003 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.005) (0.005)
Repeat1 -0.984∗∗∗ -0.981∗∗∗ -0.988∗∗∗ -0.985∗∗∗ -0.187∗∗∗ -0.187∗∗∗
(0.130) (0.130) (0.130) (0.131) (0.023) (0.023)
Repeat2 -1.517∗∗∗ -1.515∗∗∗ -1.519∗∗∗ -1.516∗∗∗ -0.266∗∗∗ -0.266∗∗∗
(0.251) (0.251) (0.251) (0.251) (0.035) (0.035)
Repeat3 -1.776∗∗∗ -1.770∗∗∗ -1.779∗∗∗ -1.773∗∗∗ -0.309∗∗∗ -0.310∗∗∗
(0.314) (0.315) (0.311) (0.312) (0.040) (0.039)
Constant -1.603 -1.713 -1.405 -1.514 1.035∗∗∗ 1.096∗∗∗
(1.073) (1.052) (1.108) (1.089) (0.156) (0.172)
Industry/Year/Type FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted/PseudoR2 0.147 0.147 0.147 0.147 0.144 0.145
N 2389 2389 2389 2389 2407 2407
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Table V: Institutional ownership of target and non-target S&P1500 firms
The table reports the mean, standard deviation, median, and 25th/75th percentiles of civil and common law institu-
tional ownership. The table displays statistics for non-targeted firms (left) and targeted (right) firms in the S&P1500
between 2000 and 2013.
S&P1500 Target Firms
Year Mean SD Pct25 Pct50 Pct75 Mean SD Pct25 Pct50 Pct75
Civil
2000 0.91 0.81 0.39 0.83 1.29 1.54 0.57 1.29 1.56 1.74
2001 0.71 0.83 0.18 0.33 1.06 1.37 0.69 0.94 1.41 1.66
2002 0.93 1.03 0.28 0.58 1.24 1.69 0.78 1.18 1.73 2.12
2003 1.44 1.50 0.37 0.93 1.99 2.67 1.37 1.79 2.69 3.30
2004 1.16 1.34 0.22 0.68 1.66 2.05 1.00 1.43 2.07 2.52
2005 1.41 1.33 0.39 0.96 2.02 2.53 1.10 1.90 2.54 3.11
2006 1.33 1.37 0.28 0.82 2.09 2.61 1.01 2.15 2.57 3.04
2007 1.64 1.68 0.36 1.09 2.45 3.12 1.54 2.32 2.84 3.78
2008 1.78 1.78 0.45 1.19 2.56 2.93 1.43 2.18 2.70 3.41
2009 1.91 1.65 0.81 1.39 2.51 3.08 1.17 2.43 2.98 3.45
2010 2.44 1.90 1.07 1.82 3.42 3.68 1.37 2.76 3.83 4.36
2011 2.51 2.15 0.94 1.69 3.73 4.22 1.71 3.47 4.25 4.91
2012 2.67 2.46 0.97 1.63 4.01 4.13 1.47 3.42 4.23 4.74
2013 2.72 2.33 1.03 1.82 4.08 4.34 1.50 3.75 4.41 5.00
Total 2.04 2.14 0.60 1.36 2.78 3.68 3.35 1.96 3.14 4.52
Common
2000 56.04 18.48 42.66 57.43 70.05 54.89 13.08 46.73 53.91 63.78
2001 60.21 18.57 46.47 61.56 74.66 56.52 13.92 48.52 54.59 66.30
2002 64.54 17.61 52.18 66.57 78.46 58.64 14.62 49.28 58.17 67.09
2003 66.73 17.01 54.76 68.41 80.16 57.70 13.93 49.68 57.06 66.45
2004 69.77 17.21 58.67 72.03 83.07 61.68 15.15 54.01 60.46 72.37
2005 71.62 16.61 61.04 74.21 84.86 64.03 16.07 50.98 61.00 76.62
2006 72.80 16.67 62.53 75.95 85.86 63.82 14.51 54.11 61.05 75.25
2007 74.82 16.41 65.20 77.59 87.42 65.92 15.30 56.63 64.86 76.59
2008 75.71 16.10 66.64 79.03 88.21 68.20 13.79 60.32 67.49 78.35
2009 75.62 15.77 66.89 78.46 88.00 68.78 14.01 59.84 69.33 78.73
2010 75.82 15.27 67.03 78.71 87.97 69.02 14.97 60.96 70.13 80.42
2011 76.70 15.17 67.69 79.80 88.11 67.98 14.17 59.36 68.25 78.29
2012 76.56 14.57 68.38 78.94 87.48 68.35 14.80 58.86 68.28 79.96
2013 76.83 15.16 68.51 80.07 88.04 70.25 13.37 60.06 69.82 80.81
Total 76.01 21.29 63.64 78.22 89.57 64.30 20.43 54.10 65.88 77.96
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Table VI: Vote support
The table reports the determinants of vote support. The dependent variable in all models is Vote, which equals the
percentage of votes in favor of a proposal. Variable definitions are given in appendix A1. Columns (1)-(3) report
the results of ordinary least squares where Vote ranges from 0 to 100, while columns (4)-(6) report the results of
fractional logistic regressions where Vote ranges from 0 to 1. All models include year, Fama-French 49 industry, and
proposal type fixed effects. The reported R2 in columns (4)-(6) is the McFadden pseudo R2. Standard errors are
clustered at the firm level. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS fGLM fGLM fGLM
Civil 0.897∗ 1.736∗ 0.549 0.061∗∗ 0.106∗ 0.037
(0.459) (0.917) (0.482) (0.031) (0.057) (0.035)
Common 0.060∗ 0.073 0.079∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.007 0.008∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.059) (0.032) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
KLDST R -0.685∗∗∗ 0.115 -0.060∗∗∗ -0.015
(0.132) (0.473) (0.011) (0.037)
KLDCON 0.211 0.154 0.019 0.016
(0.160) (0.479) (0.013) (0.040)
KLDST R × Civil -0.307∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗
(0.087) (0.007)
KLDCON × Civil 0.061 0.004
(0.094) (0.007)
KLDST R × Common 0.003 0.000
(0.007) (0.001)
KLDCON × Common -0.002 -0.000
(0.008) (0.001)
KLDT OT -0.163 -0.029
(0.350) (0.030)
KLDT OT × Civil -0.199∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗
(0.066) (0.006)
KLDT OT × Common 0.005 0.000
(0.006) (0.000)
Company -7.739 -8.130 -8.291 -0.799∗∗ -0.820∗∗ -0.837∗∗
(5.044) (5.162) (5.197) (0.403) (0.411) (0.410)
Fund 4.514∗∗ 4.525∗∗ 4.225∗∗ 0.495∗∗∗ 0.496∗∗∗ 0.478∗∗∗
(1.861) (1.886) (1.914) (0.147) (0.151) (0.151)
Publicpension 7.594∗∗∗ 7.252∗∗∗ 7.496∗∗∗ 0.693∗∗∗ 0.678∗∗∗ 0.693∗∗∗
(1.323) (1.368) (1.363) (0.107) (0.109) (0.109)
Religious 4.427∗∗∗ 4.356∗∗∗ 4.427∗∗∗ 0.518∗∗∗ 0.514∗∗∗ 0.515∗∗∗
(0.915) (0.924) (0.913) (0.100) (0.100) (0.099)
Specialinterest 1.375 1.267 1.120 0.221∗ 0.212∗ 0.195
(1.216) (1.226) (1.223) (0.127) (0.128) (0.127)
SRIfund 6.173∗∗∗ 6.063∗∗∗ 6.138∗∗∗ 0.628∗∗∗ 0.623∗∗∗ 0.625∗∗∗
(1.404) (1.448) (1.441) (0.132) (0.135) (0.133)
Union 1.591 1.382 1.628 0.280∗ 0.275∗ 0.287∗
(1.834) (1.833) (1.847) (0.164) (0.164) (0.165)
Other 5.169∗∗ 5.135∗∗ 5.222∗∗ 0.494∗∗∗ 0.498∗∗∗ 0.509∗∗∗
(2.431) (2.426) (2.441) (0.181) (0.181) (0.182)
ln(totalassets) -0.671 -0.794 -0.836 -0.045 -0.045 -0.059
(1.035) (1.078) (1.033) (0.082) (0.085) (0.083)
ln(pricetobook) -1.026 -1.392 -1.160 -0.077 -0.097 -0.084
(1.018) (1.044) (1.049) (0.077) (0.078) (0.079)
ln(capex) -0.223 -0.295 -0.407 -0.036 -0.042 -0.050
(0.928) (0.910) (0.931) (0.076) (0.075) (0.077)
ROA -0.040 -0.037 -0.042 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004
(0.079) (0.074) (0.079) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Salesgrowth -0.001 0.006 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.001
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Dividends 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tobin’s 0.468 0.463 0.514 0.036 0.035 0.040
(0.444) (0.454) (0.484) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033)
Debt/equity 0.089 0.098 0.067 0.008 0.008 0.005
(0.160) (0.157) (0.155) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Constant 3.229 1.934 4.553 -3.170∗∗∗ -3.290∗∗∗ -3.085∗∗∗
(6.556) (7.139) (6.516) (0.559) (0.624) (0.569)
Industry/Year/Type FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Repeat Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted/Pseudo R2 0.332 0.340 0.333 0.059 0.060 0.059
N 1572 1572 1572 1572 1572 1572
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Table VII: MSCI ESG - The probability of withdrawal
The table shows which firm and proposal characteristics determine the probability of a proposal being withdrawn.
The dependent variable in all models is Withdrawn, which equals 1 when the proposal is withdrawn, and 0 if not.
Variable definitions are given in appendix A1. Columns (1), (2), (4), and (5) report the results of logistic regressions.
Since we include year, Fama-French 49 industry, and proposal type fixed effects, we display linear probability models
in columns (3) and (6). Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote statistical significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Logit Logit LPM Logit Logit LPM
InstOwn 0.029∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008)
Civil 0.140∗∗ 0.026∗∗ 0.138∗∗ 0.026∗∗
(0.064) (0.013) (0.065) (0.013)
Common 0.023∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.001) (0.008) (0.001)
MSCIIA -0.001 -0.007 -0.001
(0.035) (0.035) (0.007)
MSCIES 0.020 0.006 0.001
(0.065) (0.066) (0.013)
Company 1.407∗ 1.527∗ 0.245 1.394∗ 1.518∗ 0.244
(0.790) (0.791) (0.155) (0.790) (0.789) (0.155)
Fund 1.106∗∗ 1.086∗∗ 0.166∗∗ 1.108∗∗ 1.090∗∗ 0.166∗∗
(0.445) (0.451) (0.069) (0.447) (0.453) (0.069)
Publicpension 1.800∗∗∗ 1.790∗∗∗ 0.288∗∗∗ 1.801∗∗∗ 1.792∗∗∗ 0.288∗∗∗
(0.360) (0.361) (0.057) (0.361) (0.361) (0.057)
Religious 1.757∗∗∗ 1.742∗∗∗ 0.277∗∗∗ 1.756∗∗∗ 1.743∗∗∗ 0.277∗∗∗
(0.382) (0.386) (0.061) (0.383) (0.386) (0.061)
Specialinterest 0.199 0.227 0.020 0.196 0.224 0.020
(0.363) (0.366) (0.049) (0.364) (0.366) (0.049)
SRIfund 1.551∗∗∗ 1.565∗∗∗ 0.244∗∗∗ 1.546∗∗∗ 1.563∗∗∗ 0.243∗∗∗
(0.335) (0.336) (0.050) (0.335) (0.336) (0.050)
Union 1.920∗∗∗ 1.920∗∗∗ 0.317∗∗∗ 1.914∗∗∗ 1.916∗∗∗ 0.316∗∗∗
(0.450) (0.453) (0.077) (0.449) (0.452) (0.077)
Other -0.046 -0.009 0.041 -0.050 -0.011 0.040
(0.590) (0.594) (0.073) (0.590) (0.594) (0.073)
ln(totalassets) -0.217 -0.266 -0.047 -0.221 -0.269 -0.048
(0.190) (0.193) (0.037) (0.190) (0.192) (0.037)
ln(pricetobook) 0.439∗∗ 0.437∗∗ 0.077∗∗ 0.427∗∗ 0.429∗∗ 0.076∗∗
(0.181) (0.181) (0.035) (0.183) (0.183) (0.035)
ln(capex) 0.178 0.174 0.021 0.173 0.170 0.021
(0.163) (0.164) (0.030) (0.163) (0.164) (0.030)
ROA 0.008 0.006 0.001 0.009 0.006 0.001
(0.016) (0.017) (0.003) (0.016) (0.017) (0.003)
Salesgrowth -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000
(0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001)
Dividends -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tobin’s q -0.089 -0.090 -0.017 -0.088 -0.089 -0.017
(0.067) (0.066) (0.011) (0.067) (0.066) (0.011)
Debt/equity 0.042 0.048 0.007 0.042 0.048 0.007
(0.049) (0.049) (0.009) (0.050) (0.049) (0.009)
Repeat1 -0.998∗∗∗ -1.018∗∗∗ -0.164∗∗∗ -0.993∗∗∗ -1.013∗∗∗ -0.163∗∗∗
(0.209) (0.209) (0.031) (0.208) (0.208) (0.031)
Repeat2 -0.987∗∗∗ -0.991∗∗∗ -0.160∗∗∗ -0.983∗∗∗ -0.987∗∗∗ -0.160∗∗∗
(0.329) (0.330) (0.045) (0.329) (0.329) (0.045)
Repeat3 -1.697∗∗∗ -1.683∗∗∗ -0.233∗∗∗ -1.693∗∗∗ -1.681∗∗∗ -0.232∗∗∗
(0.485) (0.476) (0.052) (0.487) (0.478) (0.052)
Constant -2.754∗ -2.219 0.193 -2.766∗ -2.208 0.193
(1.537) (1.554) (0.294) (1.522) (1.540) (0.289)
Industry/Year/Type FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Repeat Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted/Pseudo R2 0.174 0.177 0.153 0.175 0.177 0.153
N 1218 1218 1230 1218 1218 1230
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Table VIII: MSCI ESG - Vote support
The table reports the determinants of vote support. The dependent variable in all models is Vote, which equals the
percentage of votes in favor of a proposal. Variable definitions are given in appendix A1. Columns (1)-(3) report
the results of ordinary least squares where Vote ranges from 0 to 100, while columns (4)-(6) report the results of
fractional logistic regressions where Vote ranges from 0 to 1. All models include year, Fama-French 49 industry, and
proposal type fixed effects. The reported R2 in columns (4)-(6) is the McFadden pseudo R2. Standard errors are
clustered at the firm level. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS fGLM fGLM fGLM
Common 0.131∗∗ 0.301∗∗∗ 0.313∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.019∗
(0.057) (0.088) (0.173) (0.004) (0.006) (0.011)
Civil 0.478 2.195∗∗ 3.358∗ 0.030 0.131∗∗ 0.192∗
(0.633) (1.072) (1.864) (0.039) (0.059) (0.104)
MSCIIA -0.858∗∗∗ 4.503∗∗∗ -0.059∗∗∗ 0.319∗∗∗
(0.307) (1.527) (0.020) (0.106)
MSCIIA × Civil -0.411∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗
(0.161) (0.010)




MSCIES × Civil -0.616∗ -0.036∗
(0.328) (0.020)
MSCIES × Common -0.043 -0.002
(0.035) (0.002)
Company -6.474∗∗ -7.101∗∗ -6.684∗∗ -0.413 -0.461∗ -0.431
(3.200) (2.913) (3.133) (0.279) (0.252) (0.271)
Fund 5.337∗∗ 5.244∗∗ 5.545∗∗ 0.556∗∗∗ 0.572∗∗∗ 0.583∗∗∗
(2.412) (2.388) (2.415) (0.207) (0.203) (0.205)
Publicpension 6.930∗∗∗ 6.505∗∗∗ 6.695∗∗∗ 0.608∗∗∗ 0.594∗∗∗ 0.607∗∗∗
(2.113) (2.157) (2.145) (0.182) (0.182) (0.180)
Religious 4.328∗∗ 4.126∗∗ 4.366∗∗ 0.462∗∗∗ 0.452∗∗∗ 0.473∗∗∗
(1.853) (1.826) (1.758) (0.174) (0.172) (0.167)
Specialinterest 2.338 1.986 1.854 0.242 0.226 0.212
(1.999) (2.019) (1.990) (0.195) (0.193) (0.192)
SRIfund 6.103∗∗∗ 5.728∗∗∗ 6.017∗∗∗ 0.601∗∗∗ 0.594∗∗∗ 0.608∗∗∗
(2.108) (2.088) (2.079) (0.194) (0.191) (0.190)
Union -0.866 -1.284 -1.339 0.067 0.052 0.041
(2.599) (2.607) (2.643) (0.233) (0.231) (0.232)
Other 5.277∗ 5.084∗ 5.348∗ 0.491∗∗ 0.485∗∗ 0.504∗∗
(3.033) (3.001) (3.011) (0.232) (0.233) (0.232)
ln(totalassets) -0.935 -1.015 -1.149 -0.078 -0.086 -0.098
(1.512) (1.523) (1.528) (0.095) (0.096) (0.095)
ln(pricetobook) -0.938 -0.898 -0.758 -0.058 -0.061 -0.047
(1.533) (1.433) (1.475) (0.103) (0.100) (0.100)
ln(capex) -1.194 -1.789 -1.634 -0.094 -0.126 -0.114
(1.290) (1.277) (1.284) (0.088) (0.088) (0.087)
ROA 0.032 -0.031 -0.015 0.002 -0.003 -0.001
(0.129) (0.105) (0.106) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Salesgrowth 0.020 0.027 0.025 0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Dividends 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tobin’s q -0.229 -0.320 -0.274 -0.045 -0.058 -0.054
(0.446) (0.481) (0.508) (0.050) (0.055) (0.055)
Debt/equity 0.098 -0.001 -0.024 0.008 0.002 0.000
(0.260) (0.227) (0.236) (0.018) (0.016) (0.017)
Constant 14.266 1.274 -4.017 -1.893∗∗ -2.914∗∗∗ -2.814∗∗
(12.247) (11.901) (16.771) (0.852) (0.879) (1.130)
Industry/Year/Type FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Repeat Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted/Pseudo R2 0.376 0.397 0.383 0.065 0.067 0.065
N 682 682 682 682 682 682
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Table IX: Materiality - Probability of withdrawal and vote support
The table shows whether materiality matters for the probability of withdrawal and vote support. Variable definitions
are given in appendix A1. Column (1) reports the results of a logistic regression with Withdrawn as the dependent
variable. Columns (2) and (3) report the results of ordinary least squares regressions with Vote as the dependent
variable, ranging from 0 to 100. Columns (4)-(6) report the results of fractional logistic regressions with Vote as the
dependent variable, ranging from 0 to 1. All models include year, Fama-French 49 industry, and proposal type fixed
effects. The reported R2 in columns (4) and (5) is the McFadden pseudo R2. Standard errors are clustered at the
firm level. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Withdrawn Vote OLS Vote OLS Vote fGLM Vote fGLM
Material 0.021 0.725 -2.595 0.029 -0.306
(0.135) (0.921) (3.121) (0.077) (0.241)
Material × Civil -0.202 -0.017
(0.675) (0.045)
Material × Common 0.063 0.006
(0.054) (0.004)
Civil 0.117∗∗ 1.212∗∗∗ 1.256∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.415) (0.428) (0.028) (0.029)
Common 0.015∗∗ 0.061 0.036 0.006∗ 0.004
(0.006) (0.038) (0.040) (0.003) (0.003)
KLDST R 0.026 -0.567∗∗∗ -0.574∗∗∗ -0.048∗∗∗ -0.048∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.126) (0.128) (0.010) (0.010)
KLDCON 0.012 0.273∗ 0.264 0.027∗∗ 0.026∗∗
(0.026) (0.163) (0.163) (0.013) (0.013)
Company 2.226∗ -20.249 -20.426 -1.657 -1.706
(1.194) (15.710) (16.043) (1.164) (1.200)
Fund 1.662∗∗∗ 5.550∗∗ 5.686∗∗ 0.486∗∗∗ 0.500∗∗∗
(0.471) (2.337) (2.360) (0.151) (0.153)
Publicpension 1.899∗∗∗ 6.330∗∗∗ 6.354∗∗∗ 0.554∗∗∗ 0.556∗∗∗
(0.323) (1.472) (1.482) (0.117) (0.117)
Religious 2.152∗∗∗ 3.374∗∗∗ 3.563∗∗∗ 0.398∗∗∗ 0.417∗∗∗
(0.344) (0.957) (0.990) (0.095) (0.097)
Specialinterest 1.232∗∗∗ 2.842∗ 2.906∗ 0.416∗∗∗ 0.423∗∗∗
(0.367) (1.459) (1.486) (0.135) (0.135)
SRIfund 2.126∗∗∗ 3.337∗∗ 3.414∗∗ 0.362∗∗∗ 0.369∗∗∗
(0.305) (1.337) (1.339) (0.123) (0.124)
Union 1.403∗∗∗ 2.653 2.871 0.320∗∗ 0.344∗∗
(0.467) (1.941) (1.965) (0.163) (0.166)
Other 1.322∗∗∗ 4.171∗ 4.087∗ 0.382∗∗ 0.374∗∗
(0.483) (2.302) (2.287) (0.152) (0.152)
ln(totalassets) -0.331∗∗ -0.140 -0.076 -0.019 -0.013
(0.146) (1.091) (1.102) (0.086) (0.086)
ln(pricetobook) 0.126 -1.861∗ -1.811∗ -0.150∗∗ -0.147∗∗
(0.154) (0.965) (0.970) (0.073) (0.074)
ln(capex) 0.147 -0.254 -0.298 -0.026 -0.030
(0.123) (0.923) (0.926) (0.074) (0.074)
ROA 0.005 0.015 0.023 0.002 0.002
(0.013) (0.074) (0.075) (0.006) (0.006)
Salesgrowth 0.001 -0.007 -0.006 -0.001 -0.001
(0.003) (0.015) (0.015) (0.001) (0.001)
Dividends -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tobin’s -0.078 0.558 0.522 0.047 0.044
(0.072) (0.424) (0.435) (0.030) (0.031)
Debt/equity -0.015 0.248∗ 0.231 0.022 0.020
(0.028) (0.148) (0.150) (0.014) (0.014)
Constant -0.861 -3.604 -2.653 -3.877∗∗∗ -3.786∗∗∗
(1.147) (7.050) (7.188) (0.625) (0.634)
Industry/Year/Type FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Repeat Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted/Pseudo R2 0.150 0.382 0.382 0.065 0.065
N 2137 1255 1255 1255 1255
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Table X: Proxy advisors - vote support
The table reports whether proxy advisor recommendations influence our results. The dependent variable in all models
is Vote, which equals the percentage of votes in favor of a proposal. Variable definitions are given in appendix A1.
Columns (1)-(3) report the results of ordinary least squares where Vote ranges from 0 to 100, while columns (4)-(6)
report the results of fractional logistic regressions where Vote ranges from 0 to 1. All models include year, Fama-
French 49 industry, and proposal type fixed effects. The reported R2 in columns (4)-(6) is the McFadden pseudo R2.
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS fGLM fGLM fGLM
ISSRec 22.598∗∗∗ 22.060∗∗∗ 22.086∗∗∗ 1.791∗∗∗ 1.803∗∗∗ 1.829∗∗∗
(1.813) (1.577) (1.632) (0.131) (0.125) (0.135)
GLRec 7.299∗ 8.363∗∗ 9.327∗∗ 0.885∗∗∗ 1.030∗∗∗ 1.160∗∗∗
(3.843) (4.182) (4.274) (0.256) (0.273) (0.273)
ISSRec × GLRec -1.272 -1.916 -2.657 -0.638∗∗∗ -0.777∗∗∗ -0.872∗∗∗
(4.036) (4.532) (4.149) (0.232) (0.276) (0.259)
Civil 1.217 0.068 1.703∗∗ 0.076∗∗ -0.007 0.071∗
(0.804) (1.313) (0.758) (0.037) (0.059) (0.036)
Common 0.087 0.346 0.222∗∗ 0.005 0.014 0.010∗∗
(0.084) (0.235) (0.106) (0.005) (0.011) (0.005)
KLDST R -0.554∗ 4.241∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗ 0.252∗∗∗
(0.287) (1.811) (0.015) (0.097)
KLDCON -0.832 -5.189∗∗∗ -0.047∗ -0.342∗∗∗
(0.515) (1.710) (0.028) (0.103)
KLDST R × Civil -0.576∗∗ -0.042∗∗
(0.288) (0.017)
KLDCON × Civil 1.166∗ 0.072∗∗∗
(0.591) (0.027)
KLDST R × Common -0.035∗∗ -0.002∗
(0.016) (0.001)
KLDCON × Common -0.009 -0.000
(0.034) (0.002)
KLDT OT 4.840∗∗ 0.314∗∗∗
(1.863) (0.104)
KLDT OT × Civil -0.636∗ -0.051∗∗
(0.342) (0.021)
KLDT OT × Common -0.035∗∗ -0.002∗
(0.016) (0.001)
Company -12.377 -3.171 -7.642 -0.419 -0.003 -0.202
(8.432) (7.500) (8.481) (0.435) (0.410) (0.431)
Fund 1.132 -0.020 0.845 0.369∗ 0.343 0.366∗∗
(4.150) (4.692) (3.638) (0.198) (0.226) (0.186)
Publicpension 3.508 5.114∗∗ 4.932∗∗ 0.567∗∗∗ 0.643∗∗∗ 0.614∗∗∗
(2.777) (2.345) (2.247) (0.138) (0.158) (0.149)
Religious 2.350 2.542 4.212∗ 0.472∗∗∗ 0.449∗∗∗ 0.521∗∗∗
(2.995) (2.967) (2.509) (0.157) (0.172) (0.159)
Specialinterest 3.454 2.594 4.077 0.592∗∗∗ 0.521∗∗∗ 0.587∗∗∗
(2.620) (2.672) (2.534) (0.185) (0.190) (0.184)
SRIfund 3.551 4.319∗ 4.751∗∗ 0.532∗∗∗ 0.583∗∗∗ 0.613∗∗∗
(2.340) (2.211) (2.096) (0.142) (0.148) (0.145)
Union 4.003 4.388 4.384 0.527∗∗ 0.592∗∗ 0.632∗∗
(4.785) (4.545) (4.963) (0.230) (0.232) (0.248)
Other -0.669 0.664 -0.148 0.209 0.348∗ 0.329
(4.035) (3.527) (3.900) (0.197) (0.201) (0.215)
Constant -9.565 -31.182 -23.295 -4.018∗∗∗ -4.469∗∗∗ -4.207∗∗∗
(14.683) (22.529) (17.894) (0.977) (1.156) (0.979)
Industry/Year/Type FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm/Repeat Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted/Pseudo R2 0.730 0.762 0.748 0.124 0.127 0.126
Observations 185 185 185 185 185 185
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Table XI: Vote support - proxy advisor subsample
The table reports whether the results in table X hold for the same subsample of proposals without controlling for
proxy advisor recommendations. The dependent variable in all models is Vote, which equals the percentage of votes
in favor of a proposal. Variable definitions are given in appendix A1. Columns (1)-(3) report the results of ordinary
least squares where Vote ranges from 0 to 100, while columns (4)-(6) report the results of fractional logistic regressions
where Vote ranges from 0 to 1. All models include year, Fama-French 49 industry, and proposal type fixed effects.
The reported R2 in columns (4)-(6) is the McFadden pseudo R2. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. ∗,
∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS fGLM fGLM fGLM
Civil 1.277 1.345 1.890 0.085 0.020 0.091
(1.334) (1.787) (1.198) (0.061) (0.093) (0.060)
Common 0.111 0.505 0.283 0.009 0.026 0.014
(0.168) (0.341) (0.186) (0.009) (0.017) (0.009)
KLDST R -2.072∗∗∗ 5.444∗∗ -0.158∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗
(0.513) (2.478) (0.030) (0.124)
KLDCON 0.290 -4.579∗∗ 0.033 -0.300∗∗
(0.745) (2.275) (0.044) (0.130)
KLDST R × Civil -0.627 -0.034
(0.378) (0.023)
KLDCON × Civil 0.876 0.065∗
(0.652) (0.036)
KLDST R × Common -0.071∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.001)
KLDCON × Common 0.018 0.001
(0.041) (0.002)
KLDT OT 5.599∗∗ 0.321∗∗
(2.436) (0.135)
KLDT OT × Civil -0.630 -0.040
(0.397) (0.025)
KLDT OT × Common -0.069∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.001)
Company 7.451 13.611∗ 9.513 0.807∗ 1.070∗∗ 0.822∗
(7.961) (7.725) (7.659) (0.448) (0.480) (0.463)
Fund 8.292 5.306 7.143 0.814∗∗ 0.659 0.752∗∗
(6.389) (7.153) (5.722) (0.379) (0.403) (0.347)
Publicpension 12.036∗∗∗ 12.477∗∗∗ 13.402∗∗∗ 1.109∗∗∗ 1.102∗∗∗ 1.135∗∗∗
(4.129) (4.054) (3.602) (0.288) (0.302) (0.292)
Religious 11.692∗∗∗ 11.560∗∗∗ 13.488∗∗∗ 1.086∗∗∗ 1.005∗∗∗ 1.127∗∗∗
(4.239) (4.247) (3.730) (0.294) (0.303) (0.287)
Specialinterest 4.241 3.876 5.460 0.518 0.401 0.504
(4.486) (4.148) (4.080) (0.348) (0.342) (0.332)
SRIfund 9.712∗∗ 10.205∗∗ 11.119∗∗∗ 0.966∗∗∗ 0.973∗∗∗ 1.039∗∗∗
(4.124) (4.086) (3.724) (0.291) (0.297) (0.288)
Union 6.715 5.691 5.954 0.766 0.676 0.681
(8.739) (8.727) (8.919) (0.495) (0.514) (0.531)
Other 8.140 7.432 7.812 0.806∗∗ 0.829∗∗ 0.841∗∗
(6.027) (6.097) (6.028) (0.382) (0.399) (0.409)
Constant -29.445 -63.675∗ -47.809 -5.430∗∗∗ -6.400∗∗∗ -5.709∗∗∗
(28.971) (36.381) (31.060) (1.723) (1.928) (1.782)
Industry/Year/Type FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm/Repeat Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted/Pseudo R2 0.326 0.376 0.364 0.082 0.087 0.084
N 185 185 185 185 185 185
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Figure 1. Public Shareholder Engagement Process
The figure displays the process and potential outcome of filing a public shareholder proposal in the US. Adapted from
Bauer, R., Moers, F., & Viehs, M. (2015). Who withdraws shareholder proposals and does it matter? An analysis of
sponsor identity and pay practices. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 23(6), 472-488.
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(a) Civil/Common - Strengths (b) Civil/Common - Total
(c) Civil - Strengths (d) Common - Strengths
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(e) Civil - Concerns (f) Common - Concerns
(g) Civil - Total (h) Common - Total
Figure 2
Marginal effects of Civil and Common on Vote
The graphs display the average marginal effects of Civil/Common on Vote at different levels of KLDST R, KLDCON , and KLDT OT . Panels (a), (c), (d), (e), and
(f) are based on the results in Table VI, Column (5). Panels (b), (g), and (h) are based on the results in Table VI, Column (6)
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(a) Civil with Common fixed at mean (b) Common with Civil fixed at mean
(c) Civil with Common fixed at zero (d) Common with Civil fixed at zero
Figure 3
Predicted voting outcomes
The figure displays predicted voting outcomes for different percentages of Civil/Common at different levels of KLDST R. Predicted voting outcomes are calculated
using the results in Table VI, column (5). In panels (a) and (b) all other variables are fixed at their means. In panels (c) and (d) the other ownership variable is
fixed at zero, and all other variables at their means.
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(a) Civil/Common - MSCI industry adjusted (b) Civil/Common - MSCI E&S
(c) Civil - MSCI industry adjusted (d) Common - MSCI industry adjusted
Figure 4
Marginal effects of Civil and Common on Vote using MSCI ESG
The graphs display the average marginal effects of Civil/Common on Vote at different levels of MSCIIA and MSCIES . Panels (a), (c), and (d), are based on the
results in Table VIII, Column (5). Panel (b) is based on the results in Table VIII, Column (6)
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(a) Civil/Common - Strengths (b) Civil/Common - Total
(c) Civil - Strengths (d) Common - Strengths
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(e) Civil - Concerns (f) Common - Concerns
(g) Civil - Total (h) Common - Total
Figure 5
Marginal effects of Civil and Common on Vote after controlling for vote recommendations
The graphs display the average marginal effects of Civil/Common on Vote at different levels of KLDST R, KLDCON , and KLDT OT . Panels (a), (c), (d), (e), and
(f) are based on the results in Table X, Column (5). Panels (b), (g), and (h) are based on the results in Table X, Column (6)
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Table A1: Variable definitions
Variable Definition Source
Proposal specific
Vote The percentage of votes in favor of the proposal. ISS
Withdrawn Dummy variable equal to 1 when the proposal was withdrawn, and 0 if not. ISS
RepeatTarget Dummy variable equal to 1 when a firm was targeted by a shareholder proposal
in the previous proxy season, and 0 if not.
ISS
Repeat1/Repeat2/Repeat3 Dummy variable equal to 1 when the same same sponsor targeted the same firm
with the same proposal in the previous (two, three or more) proxy season(s), and
0 if not.
ISS
Company, Fund, Publicpension, Religious, Spe-
cialinterest, SRI fund, Union, Individual, Other
Sponsor type dummy variables equal to 1 when the proposal is filed by a sponsor
in the respective group, and 0 if not. All regression coefficients for these sponsor
dummies are relative to individuals.
ISS
Environment, Social Capital, Human Capital,
Business Model & Innovation, and Leadership
& Governance.
Proposal type dummy variables equal to 1 when the proposal topic belongs to
the respective group, and 0 if not.
ISS
ISSREC Dummy variable equal to 1 when ISS recommends their clients to vote for a
proposal, and 0 if they recommend to vote against.
ProxyInsight
GLREC Dummy variable equal to 1 when Glass Lewis recommends their clients to vote
for a proposal, and 0 if they recommend to vote against.
ProxyInsight
Material Dummy variable equal to 1 when the proposal topic is financially material, and 0
if the proposal topic is financially immaterial, according to the SASB Materiality
Map.
SASB
Ownership - Measured at the calendar year-end of the previous year
InstOwn The average percentage of shares outstanding held by institutional investors. Factset
Civil The average percentage of shares outstanding held by institutional investors
domiciled in civil law countries.
Factset, La Porta et al.
(1998)
Common The average percentage of shares outstanding held by institutional investors
domiciled in common law countries.
Factset, La Porta et al.
(1998)
ESG scores - Lagged by one year
KLDST R The sum of a firm’s strengths in all E&S KLD categories MSCI KLD
KLDCON The sum of a firm’s concerns in all E&S KLD categories MSCI KLD
KLDT OT KLDST R minus KLDCON MSCI KLD
Low KLDST R Dummy variable equal to 1 when a firm has a KLDST R score lower than 7 ;the
score at which the positive effect of Civil on vote support becomes insignificant,
and 0 if not.
MSCI KLD
Low KLDT OT Dummy variable equal to 1 when a firm has a KLDT OT score lower than -1 ;the
score at which the positive effect of Civil on vote support becomes insignificant,
and 0 if not.
MSCI KLD
High KLDST R Dummy variable equal to 1 when a firm has a KLDST R score higher than 27 ;the
score at which the negative effect of Civil on vote support becomes significant,
and 0 if not.
MSCI KLD
MSCIIA The industry adjusted MSCI ESG score MSCI ESG
MSCIES The MSCI E&S score, not industry adjusted MSCI ESG
Firm controls - Measured at the calendar year-end of the previous year and winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
ln(totalassets) The natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets. Compustat
ln(pricetobook) The natural logarithm of the firm’s price to book ratio. Compustat, CRSP
ln(capex) The natural logarithm of the firm’s total capital expenditures Compustat
ROA The firm’s return on assets. Compustat
Salesgrowth The firm’s growth in sales between two years prior to the proposal and one year
prior the proposal.
Compustat
Dividends The firm’s total amount of dividends. Compustat
Tobin’s q The firm’s total q ratio as calculated by Peters and Taylor (2017). Peters and Taylor (2017)
Debt/Equity The firm’s debt to equity ratio. Compustat
Table A2: Correlation matrix
The table presents pairwise correlations between the independent variables that are included in our regression models. The sample includes all S&P1500 firms
between 2000 and 2013 for which all data is available. Variable definitions are given in Appendix A1. Variables (6)-(13) are winsorized at the 1st and 99th
percentile.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
(1) Civil 1.000
(2) Common 0.033 1.000
(3) KLDST R 0.396 -0.293 1.000
(4) KLDCON 0.207 -0.281 0.436 1.000
(5) KLDT OT 0.198 -0.031 0.579 -0.481 1.000
(6) ln(totalassets) 0.481 -0.340 0.665 0.600 0.104 1.000
(7) ln(pricetobook) 0.064 -0.070 0.160 0.018 0.140 0.046 1.000
(8) ln(capex) 0.420 -0.353 0.596 0.575 0.059 0.913 0.078 1.000
(9) ROA 0.047 -0.032 0.129 0.041 0.089 0.047 0.458 0.098 1.000
(10) Salesgrowth -0.066 0.049 -0.095 -0.060 -0.038 -0.041 0.124 -0.010 0.223 1.000
(11) Dividends 0.216 -0.330 0.589 0.557 0.069 0.624 0.114 0.556 0.159 -0.037 1.000
(12) Tobin’s q -0.009 -0.040 -0.019 -0.075 0.049 -0.063 0.547 -0.050 0.381 0.232 0.007 1.000
(13) Debt/equity 0.061 -0.148 0.158 0.150 0.018 0.261 0.190 0.223 -0.139 -0.083 0.068 -0.119 1.000
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